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I. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of
divorces and annulments in the United States. In 1963, the number of
divorces and annulments totalled 428,000. By 1975, the figure had risen to
1,036,000.1 The number of children involved in such marital break-ups has
also increased. In 1963, such children numbered 562,000, whereas in 1975,
1,123,000 children were involved.2 These numbers mark a disturbing trend.
Marital break-ups are typically attended by significant trauma and misery in
both parents and children. Methods of alleviating such trauma and misery
must be developed. One area in which a legal response is appropriate is the
area of child custody. This article considers the legal response to the problem
of child custody as one means to mitigate the damaging impact of divorce or
annulment on children.
This article will compare possible approaches to the problem of child
custody. The law in France, Louisiana and other states of the United States
will be studied. France was chosen because its legal system is a prototype of the
so-called "civilian" legal systems. The various states of the United States were
chosen because they represent prototypes of the "common law" approach.
Louisiana was selected because its legal system provides a conceptual bridge
between the civilian and the common law approaches. Although geographical-
ly surrounded by common law jurisdictions, Louisiana developed its Civil
Code from French and Spanish sources. The author suggests that the ap-
proach undertaken by these systems significantly influences the nature of the
solutions adopted. Each system's view of the law's role in the solution to the
difficult problem of child custody is examined. Such an examination provides
a new perspective from which to attempt to develop a hybrid solution to the
problem in the United States.
The article begins with a discussion of the historical and conceptual roots of
the law relating to parental authority in general. Historically, the law of
custody, evolved from ancient notions of "natural" and substantive rights and
authority held by parents over their children. This discussion serves as
necessary background for the examination of the law relating to child custody
in France, Louisiana and generally in the United States. Thus, the article
traces the development of the notion of parental authority through ancient
Anglo-Saxon and Roman legal history, through its modernization in feudal
1. H. CARTER & P. GUCK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY 394
(rev. ed. 1976). See also K. SNAPPER &J. OHMS, THE STATUS OF CHILDREN IN 1977, 25 U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (Office of Human Development Services Pub.
No. 78-30133, 1978) [hereinafter cited as O.H.D.S. Pub.].
2. O.H.D.S. Pub., supra note 1.
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England and continental Europe and finally to its current status under both
common law and civil law.3
Following an examination of the historical and conceptual basis for custody,
the article analyzes the current state of the law as it relates to child custody
after divorce or separation in France, Louisiana and generally in the United
States. Finally, the article considers ways in which the law may be improved.
The discussion turns on the following questions: What policies are we attempt-
ing to promote through out custody laws? Are the policies different in the dif-
ferent systems? What system best serves its own purposes? How can our laws
be changed to better serve our policies?
II. PARENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE ROMAN, GERMANIC
AND ANGLO-SAXON TRADITIONS
A. Roman Law
1. Ancient Rome
In ancient Rome, the paterfamilias (the father or head of the family) exercised
absolute authority over his children and his spouse. The formal Roman princi-
ple of patria potestas (power over one's children) provided the paterfamilias
throughout his lifetime with absolute power over his children and his spouse,
3. "Parental authority" may be defined initially as that bundle of rights and obligations which
exists between parents and their children. See §5 III. B, C infra. Common law legislation and
cases have not defined parental authority or custody. Thus, Chief Justice Traynor of the
Supreme Court of California (a state which is a common lawjurisiction, although influenced by
some civil law tradition) has defined the concept in a manner roughly consistent with the civilian
approach. He has stated that parental authority enibraces "the sum of parental rights with
respect to the rearing of a child, including its care. It includes the right to the child's services and
earnings ... and control [over] education, health and religion." Burge v. City of San Francisco,
41 Cal.2d 608, 612, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953).
Generally, in common law jurisdictions today, the ongoing legitimate family is a self-governing
unit. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925), cited in Folberg & Graham,Joint
Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D.L. REV. 523, 537 n.88 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Folberg & Graham]. Theoretically, the law considers both parents the joint natural guardians of
their minor children. They have equal powers and obligations. Neither is in a superior position
regarding his or her rights and duties, including the right to custody of his or her children. Id. at
537. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 72a, § 1; UTAH CODE ANN. S 30-2-9, 10.
The authority of the parents over their children during the ongoing marriage includes the
rights and obligations to rear, educate, protect, control and discipline their children. See Folbcrg
& Graham, supra at nn.93 & 94; Annot., 36 A.L.R. 8F,6 (1925); People ex rel O'Connell v.
Turner, 55 IMI. 280, 284, 8 Am. Rep. 645 (1870); Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 642,
334 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1959); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925). Historically,
the courts felt that these rights and obligations resided in the parents pursuant to natural law.
People ev rel O'Connell v. Turner, supra; Newly v. Newly, 55 Cal. App. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921);
27B CJ.S. Divorce 9 308 (1959). See also Stourton v. Stourton, 8 DeC. M & G. 760, 771-72
(1857), cited in Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of t.z Child, 29 HARV.
L. REv. 485, 491 n.28 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Friedman]; In re Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D. 317,
337-38 (1883).
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including the power to abandon, sell, banish or kill his children. 4 This pater-
nal authority continued throughout the life of the father or the children. It was
so all-encompassing that it actually absorbed the legal personality and the
patrimony of the children into that of the paterfamilias.5
This extreme power was gradually diminished during the Roman Empire,
at least with regard to the control over the person of the children. Even during
the height of the reign of patria potestas, the practical application of this im-
mense formal power remained an issue. 6 Practical restraints on the father's
power existed from the beginning of Roman history and grew until the patria
potestas was reduced near the end of the Empire to nothing more than the right,
although a powerful one, of correction.7
In addition, organized religion created some restraints on the father's exer-
cise of authority. The father was the one charged with sacraprivata. As the
Romans worshipped their ancestors, the patriarch had the responsibility to en-
sure the propagation of his ancestral family line. The larger family, therefore,
could not have been insensitive to the maltreatment of its children. 8 Although
there is no evidence of what constituted excessive or abusive application of
patriarchal power, it does appear that the father would not exercise his power
over the life of his children without exceptional justification. 9 The father did
exercise his authority to banish uncontrollable children or to kill a deformed or
crippled child, but he did not exercise this power with impunity. 10
4. I M. KASER, DAs R6MISCHE PRIVATRECHT 44-45 (1955) [hereinafter cited as KASER]; H.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAw (16th ed. 1897) (1st ed. London 1861) [hereinafter cited as MAINE]; Stol-
jar, Children, Parents and Guardians, IV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
Oh. 7 at 16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Stoljar].
5. Children were alieni, not suijuris. Stoljar, supra note 4. With regard to the children's
patrimony, the paterfamilias maintained throughout his lifetime at least the usufruct and the right
of administration over whatever acquisitions his children might have made during their common
lifetimes. Therefore, Roman law viewed all property as being familial property.
In the beginning, the term pater did not refer necessarily to the biological father. Id. at 17. In-
deed, the patriarch had such absolute formal authority that the term referred to the person whose
position or status carried with it the responsibility of "protection borne by authority." Id.
6. Stoljar, supra note 4, at 16.
7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 17. Indeed the father who subjected his children to acts of capricious cruelty without
discernable justification was considered a sacer (a virtual outlaw). Id. I Voigt, ZWOLF TAFELN,
§ 15, cited in Pound, Individual Interests in the Law of Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 179
n.5 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Pound, Individual Interests].
Even down to the end of the Republic, not a little remained solely under the guardian-
ship of the family tribunal or censor's regimen mrum. Its function was two-fold for
sometimes it operated in restraint of law by condemning - though it could not prevent
- the ruthless and unnecessary exercise of legal right, as, for example, that of the head
of the house-hold over his dependents.
Muirhead, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PRIVATE LAW OF ROME, 21-22 (2d ed.), quoted in
Pound, Individual Interests, supra.
9. Stoljar, supra note 4,.at 17; KASER, supra note 4, at 52.
10. Stoljar, supra note 4, at 17.
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2. Developments Under the Roman Empire
During the Empire, the patria potestas was reduced significantly by its rulers.
Trajan" obliged fathers to emancipate sons who had been maltreated;
Hadrian 2 condemned to deportation a father who killed his son, reserving the
right to pronounce capital sentences to the state judiciary. Antoninum
Caracalla" forbade the sale of children except in cases of extreme poverty,
while Constantine, 14 followed in this respect by Justinian,' 5 restricted such
sales to newborns, thus excluding grown children. Under Constantine, in fact,
the ius vitae necisque 16 no longer subsisted even technically; public sanctions
against paternal abuse took the place of earlier interdictions that were enforced
only by religion or by a magistrate acting purely on an ad hoc basis. Thus, by
the time of Constantine, the State had fully intervened and had transformed
the old patriarchal family into a "legal family." '1 7 This transformation closely
reflected the family status that has prevailed in the modern world.
B. Germanic "'undium"
Germanic customary law was pervasive in Europe.' 8 Indeed, it represented
the central body of European law, with some local variation, in what is now
Germany, Central France, Anglo-Saxon England, Scandanavia and Northern
Italy. '9
1. The Germanic Mode
Germanic society was as strongly patriarchal as that of the Romans.
However, the Germanic notion of mund or mundium explicitly included pater-
nal obligations as well as paternal rights. Indeed, the term mund or munt literal-
11. Marcus Ulpuis Trajanus reigned as emperor of the Roman Empire from 98 A.D. to 117
A.D.
12. Publius Aelius Hadrianus reigned as emperor of the Roman Empire from 117 A.D. to 138
A.D.
13. Marcus Aurelius Antonius reigned as emperor of the Roman Empire from 211 A.D. to
217 A.D.
14. Flavius Valerius Constantinus reigned as emperor of the Roman Empire from 306 A.D. to
337 A.D.
15. Flavius Petrus SabbatiusJustinianus reigned as emperor of the Roman Empire from 527
A.D. to 565 A.D.
16. In Roman law, the ius vitae necisque was the power of life and death held by the head of the
family over its members. The head of the family "could, usually with the aid of a family council
... condemn to death and execute sons and daughters and later issue. ... [B]y the time ofiusti-
nian, the ius vitae necisque had been reduced to a power to inflict reasonable chastisement." J.
THOMAS, TErTmooK OF ROMAN LAW 414-15 (1976).
18. By Germanic law, the author refers to the law of the various Germanic peoples from the
time, of initial contact with the Romans until the change from tribal laws to national territorial
laws.
19. Stoljar, supra note 4, at 20. See also III M. LAFFERRItRE, HISTOIRE DO DRorr FRANQAIS 58
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ly meant "hand." The moral and legal concept of mund combines the notions
of rights, power and responsibility. 20 This power-protcction framework has
been the dominant theme of recent French codal development and
jurisprudence regarding child custody and parental authority. 21
Whereas the Roman extended family was formally under the legal power of
the paterfamilias, its Germanic counterpart was a more informal kinship group
containing cooperative, but equal, nuclear families. Each family was headed
by an individual patriarch. 22 The interrelationship of these families within the
greater family (Geschlechtsverband) gave rise to an overseeing body, which pro-
vided some effective safeguards against abuse of power by any of the patri-
archs. 23 This greater body eventually developed into what became known in
France as the family council which promoted the protective theme of the mun-
dium.
The patriarch in Germanic custom could be disciplined for abusing his
power. The explicit notions of protection implied warnings against abuse. In
principle, abuse could result in forfeiture of one's paternal authority. 24 In later
Italian city governments, in the period of the Franks, the State withdrew
paternal authority from the patriarch when he was adjudged "unworthy" (in-
degnita) or when he was foundto have mistreated his child, dissipated the fami-
ly fortune or persisted in his (the patriarch's) own faith in the face of his child's
conversion to Christianity. 25
2. The French Adaptation
The Germanic trend developed in central France through the droit coutumier
(customary law) which evolved from the French concept of mainbournie, mean-
ing mundium.26 In southern France, on the other hand, where the written law
ruled (le pays du droit ecrit), Roman law was carefully followed. 27
(1852); K. VON AMIRA, GERMANISCHEs REcHT (4th ed. 1960). For a discussion of Anglo-Saxon
England, see MAINE, supra note 4, at 140; E. Young, The Anglo-Saxon Family Law, in ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-SAXON LAW, 151-52 (1905) [hereinafter cited as Anglo-Saxon, ESSAYS]; H. WOLFF,
ROMAN LAw 188, 196, 199, 206 (1951) [hereinafter cited as WOLFF]. The general effect of these
customs survived the impact of Roman law and continues today.
20. Stoljar, supra note 4, at 20.
21. See notes 84-102 and accompanying text, infra.
22. Stoljar, supra note 4, at 20.
23. Id. at 21.
24. In Roman law, no such forfeiture could arise. The kind or-degree ofabuse that would have
resulted in forfeiture under the mundium is unclear. Id.
25. Id.
26. This term is a combination of main (hand) and bourg or borg (surety). Id. at 22. This notion
can be traced clearly from antiquity through the sixteenth century. The laws were initially
codified in the twelfth century in a haphazard way. WOLFF, supra note 19, at 207. See also id., at
188, 196, 199, 206, 215, 217.
27. Id. at 23.
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In French customary law, paternal authority or power (lapuissance paternelle)
belonged not only to the father but also to the mother. Moreover, paternal
power ended when a child reached majority age or received express or tacit
emancipation. Under le droit coutumier, paternal authority extended only to the
child'i person, and not to his patrimony. In fact, the child's patrimony not on-
ly remained his own personal property, but the father, who had the right to
administer the patrimony, did not have the right to the usufruct or legal enjoy-
ment of the patrimony.
The system ofjustice acted as a check over parental authority. For example,
the courts had the authority to require a father to emancipate his children if he
had mistreated them, contributed to their delinquency, or refused to provide
for their support. Thus, under the French droit coutumier existed the notion,
later incorporated into the Civil Code, that paternal authority was based
essentially upon the authority to protect one's children. The Roman view, that
parental authority existed as the absolute right of the father for the protection
of himself and the family qua family, was never part of the French droit
coutumier.
2
Paternal power under both the droit coutumier and the written law prior to the
revolutionary reforms was, nevertheless, extensive. Yet, it took revolutionary
reforms to eliminate the paternal right to incarcerate one's children as a
measure of paternal correction. The reforms prohibited incarceration without
the approbation of a family council as well as the approbation of the president
of the district court, which was required to ratify the pronounced detention.2"
Whereas the Roman patria potestas was a charter from the state giving rights
and powers to the father for the father and the family, the mundium, which was
applied in Anglo-Saxon England and central and northern France, was an
operational legal concept embedded in custom and administered by the kin-
ship group, and functioned as a guideline to protect children.30 Eventually, the
French Civil Code incorporated the mundium perception of child protection.
Notwithstanding the general protective and tempering of the mundium, the
father, unless shown to have excessively abused his power, was free to control
[T]he territory of France became divided for legal purposes into the area of droilt crit
[written law] in the South influenced by Roman law, and the area of droit coutumier
[customary law] in the North, based on Germanic customs (coutumes). The dividing line
ran parallel with the Loire from the mouth of the Gironde to the Lake of Geneva, so
that the northern three-fifths of France as it is today were controlled by the droit
coutumier, the southern two-fifths by the droit icrit. (italics added).
I K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 69 (1977).
28. See A. WEILL & F. TEsRu, CIVIL LAW: LES PERSONNES, LA FAMILLE, LES INCAPACITIS.
(4th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as WEILL & TERR#].
29. See Decree of August 1790, [1790] D. No. 16-24, tit. X, arts. 15-16, regarding judiciary
organization, cited in WEILL & TERR9, supra note 28, at 695.
30. Stoljar, supra note 4, at 23.
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his family as he wished. Sources do not indicate, however, what specific
powers a father had in this regard. The dearth of comment suggests that the
father, absent manifest abuse, had no restriction placed on his power.31
C. Anglo-Saxon England
The Germanic notion of munt extended to Anglo-Saxon England. We have
seen that the power of the patriarch under this system was tempered and con-
trolled. Indeed, at one point in England, the wife was free to repudiate a mar-
riage and to leave, taking her children and half of the marital property.3 2
1. Under the Feudal System
Feudalism and the increased power of the church ended any notion of
spousal equality or children's rights. This later English development held the
father to be the natural guardian of his children.33
In Feudal times, and for an extended period thereafter, the father had the
natural right and authority to control his children's education and religious
training.34 "Subject to certain exceptions, the father had absolute right both at
common law and equity to determine the form ofhis children'seducation and
31. Id. at 26.
32. Dooms of Aethelobert, Nos. 79-81, cited in Foster & Freed, Life with Father: 1978, 11 FAM.
L.Q. 321 n.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed] states that "if she [the wife] wish to go
away with her children, let her have half of the property. If the husband wish to have them, (let
her portion be) -as one child. If she bears no child, let paternal kindred have the 'fich' and the
'morgengyfe' " Id. Feudalism and "the church" late" rendered the wife a "non-person."
33. ANGLO-SAXON EssAYs, supra note 19, at 153. Later cases continued to support this notion.
See Stourton v. Stourton, 8 DeG. M. & G. 760, 771-72 (1857); Donohuev. Donohue, 1 S.R.D. 1;
18 N.S.W.W.N. 14, 18 (1901), cited in Friedman, supra note 3. See also In re Agar-Ellis, 24 Ch. D.
317, 337-38 (1883), where Lord Justice Brown states:
It is not the benefit of the infant as perceived by the court, but it must be the benefit of
the infant having regard to the natural law which points out that the father knows far
better as a rule what is good for his children than a Court of Justice can.
Id. In re Meades, 5 Ir. R. Eq. 98 (1870), citedin Friedman, supra note 4, at 489 n.22, holds that the
authority of the father to guide and govern the education of his child "is not to be abrogated or
abridged without the most coercive reason." Lord Justice Lindley in In re Newton [1896] I Ch.
740, 748 states:
In no case, however, that I am aware of, where the father has been alive, has the Court
disregarded his wishes concerning the religious education of his children, unless, as in
this case, he has been himself a man so ill-conditioned and of such bad conduct that the
Court thought fit altogether to deprive him of the custody of his children.
Id. See also In re McGrath [1893] I Ch. 143; In re Scanlan, L.R. 40 Ch. D. 200 (1889); Skinner v.
Orde, L.R. 4 P.C. 60 (1871); F. v. F. [1902] I Oh. 688; In re Montagu, L.R. 28 Ch. D. 82
(1884); In re Walsh, 13 L.R. Ir. 269 (1884).
34. See Andrews v. Salt, 8 Ch. App. 622 (1873), cited and quoted in Foster & Freed, supra note
32, at 322 n.4.
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religious training and his wishes had to be respected after his death."35 He had
the primary right of association with his children and to benefit from their ser-
vices.36
Feudalism and the church established nearly absolute power in the father,
making him the paterfamilias of the common law. 37 Under feudalism and later
through the development of the common law, the father represented a political
mechanism for maintaining the "king's peace" and for ensuring the con-
tinuation of the structured property system. 38 The father's extensive authority
over his children and wife, including his right to custody, remained nearly ab-
solute until the celebrated Shelley's Case." As Blackstone noted, the father had
a natural right to the custody of his children, while the mother was "entitled to
no power [over them], but only to reverence and respect." 4
Blackstone's generalization was essentially true. In the famous case of King
v. de Manneville,41 the Court of Chancery held that the father "was entitled by
law to the custody of his child." The court reached this finding even though
the father, who had caused the mother to leave by his cruelty, was incarcerated
and the child would have to live with the father's mistress.4 2 Lord Mansfield
was prepared to act as parens patriae for the child, whose father was believed to
have conspired to place the daughter in question into prostitution. 43
2. The Rise of Industrialization
Shelley's Case and the Industrial Revolution signified the demise of paternal
preference in England. 44 In 1839, Talford's Act modified the nearly absolute
rule of paternal preference for legitimate children by providing that mothers
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Foster, Dependent Children and the Law, 18 U. PrIT. L. REv. 579 (1957).
37. Foster & Freed, supra note 32, at 325.
38. Certainly, in this regard, the common law failed to respect, in any significant way, human
dignity, freedom, equality or social cooperative action. See Address by R. Pascal, The Civil Law
and Its Study, Louisiana State University Law School, Student Orientation (Sept. 12, 1967).
39. See Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817), cited in Foster & Freed, supra note
32, at 325 n.21. In this case, the poet Shelley lost custody of his children because of his atheistic
and immoral lifestyle and attitude. Id.
40. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441 (facsimile Ist cd.,
1979) [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE).
41. 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804).
42. Foster & Freed, supra note 32, at 326 n.25. See also Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody
Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12
U.C.D.L. REV. 473 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Weitzman & Dixon].
43. Rex v. Delaval, 3 Burr. 1413 (1763), cited in Foster & Freed, supra note 32, at 325 n.23. See
also Blisset's Case, Loft's Rep. 748 (1773), cited in Foster & Freed, supra note 32, at 325 n.24,
wherein Lord Mansfield anticipates "the best interests of the child" test. See also In re Clarke,
L.R. 21 Ch. D. 817 (1882); In re O'Malleys, 8 Ir. Ch. 291 (1858); In re Grimes, 11 Ir. R. Eq. 465
(1877).
44. See Foster &Freed, supra note 32, at 341.
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had had the right to custody of infants under seven years old. 45 In 1873, this
law was further amended to give the mother the right to custody of infants of
any age. 46 Underlying both the maternal and paternal preference rules was the
general proposition that parents had a natural right to the custody of, and
authority over, their children.
47
Although it appears that the absolute "paternal preference" rule did not
have any general application in the 19th century United States, 48 under the
old common law, a natural right of parents to rear their children clearly ap-
plied. This parental right still has not been seriously questioned4 9 and, indeed,
has been constitutionalized in the United States.50
45. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54.
46. An Act to Amend the Law as to the Custody of Infants, 1878, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12. See
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 226, 234 n.34 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mnookin]. See also Folberg & Graham,
supra note 3, at 531 n.49. An extensive collection of cases regarding the tender years presumption
is cited in Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15J. FAM. L. 423, 432-33
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Roth].
47. BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 441. See also II F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 434-45 (1895); L. HOCHEIMER, CUSTODY OF INFANTS (2d ed. 1899)
[hereinafter cited as HOCHEIMER]. But see R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMO.1 LAW 189
(1921) [hereinafter cited as POUND]; II H.J. STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 288-96 (7th ed. 1874). See also cases cited in Warburg, Child Custody, A Comparative
Analysis, 14 ISRAEL L. REV. 480, 481 n.5 [hereinafter cited as Warburg].
48. Mnookin, supra note 46, at 234. Many early cases demonstrate that the mother as well as
the father could claim custody. See, e.g., Cole v. Cole, 23 Iowa 433, 446 (1867); Cook v. Cook, 1
Barb. Ch. 639 (N.Y. 1846); Bascom v. Bascom, Wright 632 (Ohio 1834); People ex rel Barry v.
Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 46, 69 (N.Y. 1839). See generally J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 518, 520 (1852); A. LLOYD, LAW OF DIVORCE 241 (1887), cited in
Mnookin, supra note 46, at 234 n.34. It did have some application, however. See, e.g., Baird v.
Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384,393 (1869) (citing the dissent of Justice Sharkey in Foster v. Alston, 4
Miss. (6 Howard) 406 (1842)), which states:
We are informed by the first elementary books we read, that the authority of the father
is superior to that of the mother. It is the doctrine of all civilized nations. It is according
to the revealed law, and the law of nature, and it prevails even with the wandering
savage, who has received none of the lights of civilization.
Id.
See also Bryant v. Dukehart, 106 Ore. 359, 210 P. 454 (1922), wherein the court believed that,
as husband and wife become one, and the husband is the decision-maker, he naturally was the
controlling parent with regard to the children. See also Hibbette v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695, 29 So.
80, 81 (1900), cited in Roth, supra note 46, at 428.
49. Indeed, it is part of theJudeo-Christian tradition. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA,
TREATISE ON LAW, reprintedin THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 67 (C. Morris ed. 1959). See also
Cortez, Religious Liberty- The Rights of Parents in the Education of Their Children, 11 CATH. LAW. 285,
291 (1965).
50. See generally Developments-in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1351-83 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Constitution & Famib]. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), the United States Supreme Court held that a Nebraska law, which prohibited teaching
foreign languages to children below the eighth grade level 6f schooling, was unconstitutional as it
"interfered with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to ac-
quire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own." Id. at
401. A close reading of the case indicates that the Court also relied on the rights of the children
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Ill. CHILD CUSTODY AND PARENTAL AUTHORITY IN FRANCE
The early development of the Roman and common law concepts of parental
authority during the ongoing marriage provides an interesting backdrop to the
modern French law relating to parental authority. The French concept of
parental authority transcends the bonds of parental matrimony. It explicitly
applies to parents of a dissolved marriage and to parents of illegitimate
and the teachers in making its decision. The Court probably was more worried about the
homogenization of society than with parental rights per se, but the Court's recognition of the ex-
istence of parental authority clearly exists.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court held that under the doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska the right and authority of parents to send their children to private military
school was part of"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
[their] children. .. ." Id. at 534-35. "It is not seriously debatable that the parental right to guide
one's child intellectually and religiously is a most substantial part of the liberty and freedom of
the parent." Id. at 518.
On many occasions, the United States Supreme Court has reinforced this view that parents
have the right and authority to rear their own children. In 1944, the Court held that "the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Court stated that this authority was part of the
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Id. In 1968, the Court declared that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held unconstitutional a Wisconsin law
requiring Amish parents to send their children to public school after the eighth grade. The
parents believed that such education would estrange their children from God and their religious
upbringing. The Court held that Wisconsin could not deny Amish parents the right and authori-
ty to direct "the religious upbringing and education of their children in the early and formative
years .... " Id. at 213-14. According to the Court, parents have "fundamental interests ... to
guide the religious future and education of their children." Id. at 232. For additional cases ad-
dressing the unconstitutionality of state intrusion into the family, see Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). The elements
of parental authority have not been clearly elaborated. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS S 17.2
at 573 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]; Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 537. At least one
court has recognized parental authority to include the right and obligation to educate and to con-
trol the religious upbringing of one's children. Parental authority has also been recognized to in-
clude the power to control and discipline one's children, the duty to provide necessary and ap-
propriate medical care, and the obligation to protect and care for children generally. Burge v.
City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 262 P.2d 6 (1953). In Burge, ChiefJustice Traynor defined
custody during marriage as that which "embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the
rearing of a child, including its care. It includes the right to the child's services and earnings ...
and the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education,
health and religion." Id. at 12. Both Great Britain and Australia have recently passed legislation
under which either parent may apply for a court order to partition custodial rights and duties
during the ongoing marriage. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 538 n.97. See also Gaddis &
Bintliff, Concurrent Custody, A Means of Continuing Parental Responsibiliy After Dissolution, A.F.L.C.
JOINT CUSTODY HANDBOOK 15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Gaddis & Bintliff]. See also [1977] 3
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4047, 4052. Since 1970, the maiority of state laws in the United States pro-
vide that parental obligations are parental rights which apply equally to both parents. Folberg &
Graham, supra note 3, at 538 n.97.I.
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children.51 We will, therefore, consider this concept in two stages: (1) during
the ongoing marriage and (2) after dissolution of the marriage or legal separa-
tion of the parents.
A. Recent Reform
Beginning in 1965, significant changes were made in French law regarding
marital and parent-child relationships. 52 Essentially, these changes emphasiz-
ed the equality of the spouses in matters relating to the marriage and to the
children of the marriage. 53 The new articles of the Civil Code make it clear
that serving the interests of the children is the primary motive to be considered
by the court in making its determinations of child custody or other matters
relating to a child after the dissolution of a marriage.
1. Paternal Power and Parental Authority
The law ofJune 4th, 1970, replaced all usage of the term "paternal power"
(puissance paternelle), which had been the term used at least since the promulga-
tion of the Civil Code, with the term "parental authority" (I'autoriti
parentale). This reform took place in conjunction with a complete reorganiza-
tion of Title IX of Book One of the French Civil Code. 54
The changes promulgated by the amendments in 1970, symbolized by the
51. See FR. C. Civ. arts. 286-342, 374.
52. Essentially, new articles 286-295 of the French Civil Code replace former articles 295-305.
53. WILL & TERRA, supra note 28, at 699. In 1965, the French began to promulgate amend-
ments to the Civil Code which promoted spousal equality. See, e.g., FR. C. Civ. arts. 213-215,
371-2.
54. WEILL & TERRA, supra note 28,-at 696-98. The new title IX contains forty-three articles in-
stead of the seventeen articles contained in the old title IX (arts. 371-387). The additional articles
added to the new title IX include those dispositions of the Law of July 24, 1889, which relate to
the forfeiture of parental power. The new title also includes articles designed to ensure additional
and more efficient protection of a child after separation, divorce or death of his parents. See, e.g..
FR. C. Civ. art. 373-3. The new title IX also includes new dispositions regarding illegitimate
children and establishes parental authority in the mother or the father who has acknowledged the
child, or in the mother if both parents have acknowledged the child. See FR. C. Civ. art. 374. It
also addresses relationships between grandparents and grandchildren, which heretofore had been
simply a part of the jurisprudential development. See, e.g., FR. C. Civ. art. 371-4, which provides
that although parents have parental authority, including the right to visit and correspond with
their children, the parents are prohibited, except for good cause, from creating any obstacle to the
personal relationship of their children with either set of grandparents. Indeed, if both parents die,
it will likely be the grandparents upon whom the court may confer guardianship. For commen-
taries on the Law of June. 4, 1970, see [1971] Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.]
Chronique [Chron.] 1 note Colombet; R. LEGEAIS, L'AUTORITt PARENTALE (1973); Law of
June 4, 1970, [1971] Juris-Classeur Piriodique, La Semainejuridique [J.C.P.] I No. 2421 note
Gobert; TERRA, A PROPOS DE L'AUTORIT PARENTALE, RtFORMES DU DROIT DE LA FAMILE, 20
ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROrr 45 (Sirey, 1975). See also other authorities cited in WEILL &
TERRA, supra note 28, at 696 n.I.
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change in terminology from "paternal power" to "parental authority," were
significant. For example, the Civil Code ceased to conceive relationships be-
tween parents and the child as a matter of simple power and domination based
on status. Similarly, the relationship between the husband and wife ceased to
be based on status. The new Code articles made it clear that parental authority
was conferred upon parents by the Civil Code for the purpose of protecting the
child. This perspective on the law of paternal authority had already been
developed in French jurisprudence and in piecemeal legislation, but had not
been, heretofore, manifested in the Civil Code.55
Thus, the Civil Code envisions parental authority as being based upon a
complex of rights and duties between the parents and their children, having as
its purpose the protection of the children. In addition, the 1970 amendments
made it clear that parental authority as conceived by the Civil Code is
established in both parents in an ongoing marriage, rather than in just the
father. 5
6
Article 371-2 of the French Civil Code states that parental authority belongs
to both parents. Moreover, this article provides that authority belongs to the
parents for the purpose of protecting their children's security, health and
morals. 57 Parents have the right to physical custody and to oversee the rearing
and the education of their children. At the same time, however, parents have
the corresponding obligation to care for, watch over, and properly educate their
children. The right of custody over one's children and the more general right
of parental authority are granted to the parents only so that they can better
perform the obligations and duties owed to their children. Parental authority
is not simply a privilege of the holder. 58
55. See WEILL & TERRE, supra note 28, at 696-98.
56. Id. At the time of promulgation of the Law ofJune 4, 1970, the Civil Codes of West Ger-
many, Israel and the Netherlands already provided that the mother and the father exercise equal
parental authority. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that parental authority exists for both the
father and the mother during their marriage, but that in the case of a difference of opinion be-
tween the mother and the father, the father exercises this authority. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 216,
para. 2. Similarly, the Swiss Civil Code also provides the father with the power to exercise paren-
tal authority should there be disagreement between the two parents. In Belgium, according to the
Law of Apr. 8, 1965 regarding the protection of youth, the father has the power of decision in
matters relating to parental authority, while the mother retains the capacity to petition the court
to question the father's judgment. In Italy, since May 19, 1975, both parents conjointly exercise
he potesta, or parental authority. In Spain and in Austria, on the other hand, parental authority
belongs solely to the father. WEILL & TERR9, supra note 28, at 697 n.2.
57. FR. C. Civ. art. 371-2.
58. WEILL & TERR#, supra note 28, at 697, 699; Simler, 70 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CIVIL [REv. TRIM. DR. Civ.] 685 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Simler].
Prior to June 1970, the rights and obligations of parents were provided for in several texts
referred to in the first article of the Law ofJuly 24, 1889, relating to the automatic forfeiture of
the rights based upon "paternal power." The major attributes of parental authority, at least
since June 4, 1970, include the parental right and obligation of custody and supervision of the
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The spouses assume together the responsibility for the guidance of their
children both in a material and a moral sense.59 Moreover, the Civil Code
views the matrimonial domicile as being the place that the husband and the
wife choose together. 60 Thus, the domicile of the minor nonemancipated
children is the familial domicile, rather than the paternal domicile as it was
under the old law. 61 In accordance with the policy of spousal equality, the
parents share the right and obligation to determine together how to rear their
children. 62 French law prior to 1970 provided that "paternal power" was held
by both the father and the mother, but that during the marriage this power
was to be exercised by the father in his capacity as head of the family. 63
2. The Question of Joint Parental Authority.
Joint parental authority was the subject of heated debate in the French
Parliament in 1970. It was argued, for example, that joint authority could
paralyze the family whenever the parents disagreed with respect to the child's
child, and the right and the obligation to control the child and the child's relationships with
others.
59. FR. C. Civ. art. 213.-
60. FR. C. Civ. art. 215.
61. See FR. C. Civ. art. 108-2. But see LA. CIV. CODE art. 39, which retains the "paternal"
domicile, cited in WEILL & TERRt, supra note 28, at 699.
62. See WEILL & TERR9, supra note 28, at 699. E.g., both the mother and father must agree to
allow the child to leave the familial domicile. FR. C. Civ. art. 371-3.
63. WEILL & TERRt, supra note 28, at 717. See, e.g., FR. C. Civ. art. 373, para. 1 (amended
1970). Note the similarity between the old French law and current Louisiana Civil Code Article
216. This article provides that when jointly-held parental authority exists, the will of the father
prevails when a dispute arises between the father and the mother. LA. CIV. CODE art. 216. To
protect third parties who deal with parents having authority over children, the revised French
Civil Code, Article 372-2, presumes that either parent, acting alone, within his or her scope of
parental authority, has the accord of the other spouse. The other spouse can rebut this presump-
tion, however, by presenting evidence to the contrary. SinceJune 4, 1970, French Civil Code Ar-
ticle 1384 has established that both parents are jointly and severally liable for damage caused by
their minor children who live with them. Each parent-is thus liable for the whole of the damage,
and the party damaged may sue either one or both of the parents. See S. LiTVINOFF, THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS IN THE LOUISIANAJURISPRUDENCE 565-98 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LITvINOFF].
6 S. LrrvINOFF, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: OBLIGATIONS § 21 (1969). See alsoJudgment of
June 12, 1963, Cass. civ. 2e, [1963] J.C.P. IV 103; Judgment of June 13, 1963, Cass. civ. 2e,
[19631 J.C-P. IV 103, cited in 62 REv. TRIM. DR. CiV.- 115 (1964). See also P. OLLIER, LA
RESPONSIBILIT CIVILE DES PERES ET MEREs (1961). Prior to 1970, article 1384 held the head of
the household liable. Thus, the father was liable under normal circumstances, and the mother
was liable only upon the death of the father or upon the father's forfeiture, for whatever reason, of
his parental authority. WEILL & TERRi,, supra note 28, at 702 n. 1.
French law relating to parental responsibility for damage caused by minor children, however,
is different from that in Louisiana. Louisiana law provides for vicarious liability of the father f -
any damage caused by their minor unemancipated children residing with them. In the absence of
the father, vicarious liability extends to the mother or the guardian. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2318.
French law, rather than establishing vicarious liability, provides a presumption that the parents
did not raise their children properly, thus establishing the direct responsibility of those pan -.
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upbringing but refused to seek a judicial resolution. Indeed, the initial 1970
proposal of law, not unlike Article 216 in the Louisiana Civil Code, provided
that the father's will would prevail in a dispute between the father and the
mother. However, the proposal provided for the wife to bring objections
against the exercise of her husband's authority before a competent tribunal.
The proposed law was subject to two objections. First, opponents felt that it
would maintain the inequality of spouses and the predominance of the male
over the female in the family. This predominance would have re-established
the bias which existed in the Code prior to the amendment and which was in-
tended to be eliminated by the reforms. Secondly, the authority residing in the
head of the family would be confided to the judge in case of dispute, often
resulting in a mzinage a trois between the judge, the husband, and the wife. 61
The Parliament eventually resolved the problem in the following way: when
a dispute arises between the parents with regard to the best interests of the
children, "the practice that they [the parents] have utilized in the past in
similar situations will establish the rule that governs them now.' 's Thus,
through prior practice the parents create their own law. In the absence of such
practice, or when the existence or merits of such practice have been placed in
dispute, either spouse may petition the court to initiate guardianship pro-
ceedings. The judge, after attempting to conciliate the parties, rules on the
matters presented to the court. 66
Whether the Parliament's solution has achieved its goals remains an issue.
Because the former law has allowed the father's will to prevail, past practice
may tend to support the continuance of the bias. Moreover, in many cases the
dispute may not be amenable to resolution through reference to past practice.
The judge all too often may be forced to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the parents.
The Parliament has attempted to establish a mechanism to encourage the
resolution of conflicts while respecting the best interests of the children. When
the mechanism does not resolve a dispute or creates a dispute, the court, after
attempting to conciliate the parties, will determine the best interests of the
child.67
Moreover, in France, the parents are not liable where they are unable to prevent the act which
caused the damage. See FR. C( Civ. art. 1384, para. 7. In Louisiana, however, parents are liable
whether they would have been able to prevent the act or not.
64. WEzLL & TERt , supra note 28, at 719-21.
65. FR. C. Civ. art. 372-1, p.ra. 1.
66. Id., para. 2. In France, the judge plays a very active role in matters of guardianship. A
judge assigned to the local court of original jurisdiction sits in the capacity ofjuge des tudles and
presides over the guardianship proceeding (la lutelle).
67. The laws governing the hearing to determine the best interests of the child include FR. C.
PR. Civ. arts. 882-886-2, 887 (as modified by Decree no. 70-1276 of Dec. 23, 1970). See WELL &
TERRt, supra note 28, at 720 n.1. With regard to the jurisdiction or competence of the judge in
guardianship proceedings wherein disputes as to the exercise of parental authority exist, seeJudg-
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B. General Nature of Parental Authority6 8
Parental authority, as defined by the French Civil Code, is designed to
serve the public good. The drafters of the Code have attempted to provide the
authority that will best promote the traditional role of the family while
safeguarding the rights of the children. Thus, parental authority transcends
the will or the wishes of any of the interested parties.
6 9
France, like other Civil Code jurisdictions, recognizes the natural relation-
ship between parents and children and specifically provides that children are
subjected to the authority of their parents.70 Yet, parental authority not only
comprises the right of parents to raise their children, but also entails the
obligation to care for them. This authority and its corresponding obligations
exist exclusively for the purpose of protecting the children. Under the French
Civil Code parents, upon the birth of their children, assume substantive and
enforceable obligations with respect to their offspring. They must care for,
raise, educate, provide nourishment and meet all other physical and moral
needs of their children. Parental authority imparts to parents a qualified right
to be exercised in the best interests of their children. The right does not exist to
serve the .interests of those who hold that right.71
Included within the scope of parental authority is the right to custody of
one's children. This right has deep historical roots. Both French tradition and
the common law consider the biological parents as the persons most naturally
inclined to serve the interests of their children. The Code recognizes that it is
in the interests of the children to be in the custody of those persons who
naturally have the closest and most loving relationship with them. Thus, in
practice, the biological parents are typically accorded custody. Parents are
seen to have the right to custody of their children and the right to hold parental
authority until their children reach majority. In France, the Civil Code
recognizes that (1) it is in the best interests of the children to be under the con-
trol and custody of their parents, and (2) the best interests of the parents, the
family and the state also will be served by the promotion of this relationship.
The right of custody, of course, is subject to divestiture by the courts upon
evidence that the primary policy of child protection is not being served by
those who have the right to exercise parental authority.
72
ment of Feb. 8, 1973, Cour d'appel, Poitiers. 119731 GAZI1IE DE PALAIS [GAZ. PAL.] II 692-93
(Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1973), [1973] D.S.JUR. SOMMAIRS [Somm.] 133;Judgment ofJan. 13, 1973,
Trib. gr. inst., Amiens, [1974] GA.. PAl.. I 44. Seealso commentary regarding these two decisions
by Nerson, 72 REV TRIM. DR. CIV. 136 (1974), cited in WEILL & TERR9, supra note 28, at 720 n.3
[hereinafter cited as Nerson].
68. See FR. C. Civ. arts. 371-387.
69. WEIL & TERa, supra note 28, at 693; FR. C. CIv. art. 376.
70. See FR. C. Civ. arts. 371-371-3.
71. WEiLL & TERi, supra note 28, at 694. See also Simler, supra note 58.
72. FR. C. Civ. arts. 371-2, 372, 372-1, 373.
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Thus, in order to promote the public good, parental authority is subject to
judicial control. Such authority may be removed from the parents, in whole or
in part, if the judiciary determines, at the request of a relative, an interested
party, or the ministerepubli,73 that the parent has abused his or her authority,
abandoned the child physically or morally or proved himself unfit for the exer-
cise of parental authority. 74 Thus, an abuse of right may attach to any aspect
of parental authority. 5 Parental authority is to be exercised primarily in the
interests of the child, without neglecting the interests of the family. If parental
prerogative is directed towards a contrary goal, for example, in pursuit of
selfish interests, the French courts will not hesitate to annul the act, even if the
act has legal validity. 76
73. This office may function as a public advocate's office and possesses powers similar to a
state attorney general's office in the United States.
74. FR. C. CIv. arts. 373, 378-381.
75. For an excellent analysis of the abuse of rights notion, see Cueta-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35
LA. L. REv. 965 (1975).
76. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 4, 1894, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1895] Recutil Pdiodique et
Critique [D.P.] II 484; Judgment of Dec. 4, 1894, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1897] Sirey, Jurispru-
dence [S. Jur.] II 73 note Wahl.
In the old French droit coutumier, as opposed to the Roman influenced droji icrit, paternal power
belonged not only to the father but also to the mother. Paternal authority, in customary law,
ended when the child reached majority or upon the child's emancipation either through the ex-
press act of emancipation or the tacit emancipation through marriage. Paternal authority did not
extend to the child's patrimony under customary French law, but only to his or her person. In
fact, not only did the child's patrimony remain his own personal property, but the father, who
had the right to administer the patrimony, did not even have the right to a legal right of enjoy-
ment over the patrimony. WEILL & TERRA, supra note 28, at 695.
The droit coutumier allowed the state to maintain a degree of control over parents with regard to
the exercise of their authority. For example, a court could require a father to emancipate his
children if he had mistreated them, had caused them to be delinquent, or had refused to provide
food for them. Id. Thus, under French customary law we see the development of the notion, later
to be incorporated into the French Civil Code, that parental authority or paternal power is
nothing more than the authority to protect one's children. The Roman notion that parental
authority existed as an absolute right of the father for his protection and for the protection of the
family qua family, was never part of french droit coutumier. Id. at 694-95.
After the French Revolution, "revolutionary law" adopted some of the principles of customary
law and continued to diminish the absolute paternal power which had been part of the Roman
law. For example, the Decree of Aug. 28, 1792, provided that "majors will no longer be subject
to parental authority which now covers only minors." Id. at 695. This decree was a generaliza-
tion for all of France of French droit coutumier. Specific reforms brought about more significant
limitations to a generalized paternal power. For example, the right of parents to disinherit their
children pursuant to their parental authority was withdrawn by the Decree of 9 fruct. an. II,
quest. 23, promulgated under the Revolutionary regime. Id.
Parental power of correction under both customary and written law prior to the revolutionary
reforms was extensive. For example, it was not until 1790 that a decree prohibited the right to in-
carcerate one's children, without the approbation of a family council and the president of the
district court, as a measure of paternal correction. Decree of August, 1790, [1790] D. No. 16-24,
tit. X, arts. 15-16, cited in WEILL & TERRAt, sup ra note 28, at 695. The French Civil Code, when it
was finally promulgated in 1804, consolidated this modern conception of "paternal power,"
focusing on the interest of the child, himself. However, the Code was, in some respects, reac-
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1. Exercise of Parental Authority77
The French Civil Code provides that the mother and the father have joint
legal authority over their children? 8 In principle, all children who have
established maternity or paternity, whether they are legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, are subject to parental authority. 79 Furthermore, parental authority
continues to exist until the death of both the father and the mother, or after
either parent or both have been found by the courts to be unworthy of exercis-
ing such authority.80
Once both parents have died or have lost their right to exercise parental
authority, the child will be placed under guardianship. 81 There is also the
tionary, i.e., with respect to the legal usufruct of the parents over their minor children's property.
On this point, the Code took a step'backwards. WEIL. & TERRt, supra note 28, at 695.
77. See 3 MAZEAUD, LEQONS DE DRorr CIVIL, tome 1, 585-86 (6th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited
as MAZEAUD I], where ProfessorJuglart explains that it is necessary to distinguish the concept of
parental authority, which inchides theparental right of custody, supervision and education, from
other related, yet distinct, rights and obligations of parentsvis-i-vis their children. Examples of
the latter include: (1) parental consent to marriage, which is exercised by the father and the
mother. This consent which passes to the guardian of the children when the parents have forfeited
this right or have died; (2) the right to consent to adoption; and (3) the right to emancipate one's
children. These latter rights do not derive from parental authority. Thus, according to Professor
Juglart, French law may still oblige an emancipated child to obtain his parents' consent to marry.
Id.
Professor Weill perceives parental authority, in a broader sense. He explains that parental
authority includes more than those .rights which are enumerated in the articles that define paren-
tal authority (i.e., the right to physical custody, supervision, control over correspondence, and
the legal enjoyment of the child's patrimony) (FR. C. CIV. 'arts. 371-387). Rather, he contends
that the authority extends to any right afforded to parents by the Civil Code. For example, within
the notion of parental authority, Professor WeiU includes the right to consent to the marriage of
the unemancipated minor (FR. C. CIV. arts. 148-164), the right to emancipate one's child (FR.
C. Civ. art. 477), the right to consent to the adoption by another person (FR. C. Civ. art. 348),
and the right to administer the property of one's children (FR. C. Civ. art. 389). See WEILL &
TERRIt, supra note 28, at 698.
78. FR. C. CIv. art. 372.
79. WEILL & TERRI, supra note 28, at 716. FR. C. Civ. art. 374, para. 1. With regard to adop-
tion, see FR. C. Civ. arts. 343, 370-2. In Louisiana, parental authority never arises for the
parents of illegitimate children (LA. Civ. CODE art. 238), and it ends with majority or emancipa-
tion (LA. Civ. CODE art. 261), separation judgment (LA. CiV. CODE art. 246), or dissolution of
marriage (LA. CiV. CODE art. 246).
80. FR. C. Civ. arts. 373, 378-81; WEILL & TERRt, supra note 28, at 721-22.
81. For the law relating to guardianship, see FR. C. Civ. arts. 378-475. Both guardianship and
parental authority terminate upon emancipation or majority of the child. In addition, the court
establishes guardianship when a child has not established filiation with either his father or his
mother. WEILL & TERRt, supra note 28, at 716-17.
Article 390 of the French Civil Code specifies that guardianship does not begin until the father
and the mother have died, or until the court has deprived them of their parental authority pur-
suant to the Civil Code. FR. C. Civ. art. 390. See also FR. C. CIV. art. 373. Furthermore, when
there is neither a mother nor a father to exercise parental authority, the Code requires the court
to initiate guardianship proceedings. Article 373 also provides an exception to the general princi-
ple that guardianship will not arise until the death of both parents. It provides that a parent will
forfeit his or her parental authority (1) if the parent, by reason of incapacity, absence, distance or
302 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IV, No. 2
possibility that a French court will establish a program similar to Louisiana's
"split tutorship." In such a situation, authority continues with the parents,
but a special tutorship is established in some person or institution to manage
the child's estate.
8 2
In French law, only the father and the mother obtain parental authority. No
other person, including the grandparents, can have such authority. 83 In
France, if one parent dies, parental authority continues in the surviving
parent. If one parent has forfeited his or her right of parental authority, such
authority continues in the other parent.8 4
The most important elements of parental authority, insofar as this study is
concerned, are the rights and obligations of custody, supervision, and educa-
tion. Parental authority includes the general right and obligation to oversee
the child's general guidance and rearing.
According to French doctrine and jurisprudence, parental authority in-
cludes the right to prohibit any relationship that is judged by the person hav-
ing parental authority to be dangerous or contrary to the best interests of the
child. 85 The Code also specifies that parental authority includes general con-
trol over the child's person.8 6 Thus, parental authority provides the parents
with a quasi-sovereign power.
any other cause, is rendered incapable of exercising his or her volition; (2) if the parent has con-
sented to the delegation ofhis or her rights in accordanci with the rules established in Chapter X
S III; (3) if the court finds that the parent has abandoned his or her obligations to the child, and
has not resumed such obligations over a six-month period; and (4) if parental authority has been
judicially terminated or withdrawn in whole or in part. FR. C. Civ. art. 373. Author's transla-
tion.
Article 390 of the French Civil Code provides an additional situation in which guardianship
arises prior to the death of the mother and the father; that is, when neither parent has recognized
or voluntarily acknowledged an illegitimate child. Article 390 states that guardianship pro-
ceedings must be opened when the father and the mother are both deceased or are in one of the
situations described in article 373. Guardianship proceedings will also commence on behalf of an
illegitimate child if neither the father nor the mother has voluntarily recognized the child. FR. C.
Civ. art. 390.
In France, as opposed to Louisiana, parental authority over the child's person may exist in the
parents even after a court has established guardianship. The fact of guardianship, however, puts
an end to the parent's legal administration over the child's estate.
82. FR. C. Civ. art. 391. When such a situation arises, the parents maintaining their parental
authority, will continue to have the right to the legal enjoyment of the child's estate. WEILL &
TERRI.t, supra note 28, at 717.
83. WEILL & TERRa, supra note 28, at 717. FR. C. Civ. arts. 371-2, 376.
84. FR. C. Civ. arts. 373-1, 373-3.
85. See, e.g., FR. C. Civ. art. 371-3 (prohibits the child from leaving the family household
without permission ofhis father and mother); FR. C. Civ. art. 108-2 (provides that the domicile
of a child is that of his parents or the parent with whom he resides).
86. WEILL & TERRA, supra note 28, at 702. The parents may not restrict the right ofvisitation
belonging to the child's grandparents, FR. C. CIV. art. 371-4, nor of any other person deemed by
a court to have such a right. FR. C. Civ. art. 371-4, para. 2. The provision in Article 371-4,
paragraph 2, that the court may recognize and award a right of visitation and correspondence to
individuals not having parental authority was simply a legislative recognition of prior
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2. Forfeiture of Parental Authority
In principle, parental authority and custody are quasi-absolute rights which
may be removed from the parents only in cases of necessity.8 7 French Civil
Code Article 373 provides that a parent will forfeit his parental authority
under the following circumstances:
1) if, due to incapacity, absence, distance, or any other cause he is
incapable of exercising his volition;
2) if he has consented to a delegation of his power;
3) if he has been convicted for failure to meet his familial obliga-
tions, either moral or pecuniary (abandon defamille), to the extent
he has not resumed such obligation over a six-month period;
4) if his parental authority has been judicially terminated or
withdrawn as to some or all of his rights.
In addition to the provisions of Article 373, the French Penal Code, in con--
junction with Civil Code Article 378 and 378-1, provides for forfeiture and
penal sanctions in cases of abandonment or abuse of parental authority.88
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 29, 1966, Cass. Civ. ire, [1966] D.S. Jur. 369 note
Rouast, [1966] J.C.P. 1114737. See also Nerson, 64 REv. TRIM. DR. CIV. 782, 789-94 (1966), in
which an adulterous father was recognized by the court as having a right of visitation with his
child. See alsoJudgment ofJan. 9, 1969, Cour d'appel, Paris (Ch. Ire), [1969] D.S. Jur. 144 note
R.D.; Nerson, 67 REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 317 (1969), died in WEILL & TERA, supra note 28, at 701
n.4. See also articles of the CODE DE FAMILLE E D'AIDE SOCIALE (as modified by Decree ofJan. 7,
1959), [1959] D. No. 59-101), dted in MAZEAUD I supra note 77, at 589.
87. FR. C. Civ. art. 371-3.
88. The notion of abandonment in the French Penal Code, found in Articles 357-1 and 357-2,
contemplates not only physical abandonment by leaving the family domicile, but also includes
moral abandonment. See, e.g., FR. C. PAN. art. 349- French Civil Code Articles 378 and 378-1
provide:
The father and mother may forfeit their parental authority by an express disposition of
a penal judgment, if they are found guilty, either as perpetrators, co-perpetrators, or
accomplices of a crime or offense committed upon the person of their child, or as co-
perpetrators or accomplices of a crime or offense committed by their child. This
forfeiture is applicable to ascendants in addition to the father and the mother for any
aspect of parental authority that may devolve upon them over their descendants.
FR. C. Civ. arts. 378, 378-1.
Parents who manifestly endanger the security, health or morals of their child through ill-
treatment, habitual drunkenness, notorious misconduct or delinquency, or through lack of
proper care or guidance may, apart from any penal action, forfeit their parental rights. Where
the court has ordered special measures to assist the child in his moral and social education
(l'assistance iducative), the father and the mother may forfeit their parental authority upon failure
to exercise, for over two years, those parental rights and duties remaining under article 357-7.
A member of the child's family, the child's guardian or the miniqicre public can bring judicial
proceedings before the ordinary court of original jurisdiction (tribunal de grands instance). FR. C.
Civ. art. 378-1. Author's translation. The judge has authority to order special measures of
assistance for the child. FR. C. Civ. art. 375-1. Article 375-7 provides:
The parents of a child subject to court-ordered special assistance (des mesures d'assistance
iducatie) conserve over that child their parental authority and exercise all of the at-
tributes of parental authority that are not inconsistent with the application of the said
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French jurisprudence views forfeiture of parental authority more as a matter
of protection for the child than as a punishment or penalty to the parents.8 9
Initial revocation of parental authority or its forfeiture is provisional. Under
Article 381 of the Civil Code, parents may have their forfeited authority or
any part of it, re-established. No action for the re-establishment of parental
authority may be brought until one year after the judgment of forfeiture has
been made final. If the parents' request for the re-establishment of parental
authority is denied by the court, and this denial has been made final, the
parents must wait another year before they can renew their request. Should
the child be placed for adoption before the parents request the restitution of
their rights, the parents have lost their right to consent to adoption. Once this
occurs, the parents have lost their right to the re-establishment of parental
authority notwithstanding any change with regard to their fitness. 9
a. Conjoint Exercise of Parental Authority
Parental authority and the exercise thereof during the marriage belong to
both parents conjointly. 91 Should one parent die or be deprived of the right to
exercise parental authority, the other parent retains exclusive authority, even
if that parent had not been exercising it up to that moment. 92
order. They cannot emancipate their child without the authorization of the juvenile
judge, as long as the order is in force. If it has been necessary to place the child outside
the parents' home, the parents conserve a right of correspondence and a right of visita-
tion. The judge fixes the conditions thereof and may even, if the interests of the child so
require, decide that the exercise of these rights, or any one of them, will be provisionally
suspended. Id. Author's translation.
Although forfeiture may be partial, most often it will be total, and will include patrimonial as well
as personal aspects. Unlike the pre-reform law, children born after the judgment of forfeiture are
not affected automatically by operation of the law. See FR. C. Civ. arts. 379, 379-1.
89. WEILL & TERRt, supra note 28, at 748. Article 203 of the French Civil Code provides that
the spouses, by the sole fact of their marriage, have contracted to nourish, support and raise their
children. Articles 349, 352, and 357-1 of the French Penal Code recognize abandonment as a
criminal offense. Interestingly, the French have established a mechanism whereby parents may
be able to avoid criminal sanction for abandonment of a child if they deliver the child to an in-
stitution which cares for abandoned children. See CODE DE FAMILLE ET D'AiDE SOCIALE art. 55. It
was understood, as early as 1811, that such institutions were necessary in order to avoid infan-
ticide. The Decree of 1811 established the first of these institutions, known as tours, in convents
and orphanages. In order to "dispose" of a child, a parent would anonymously place his child in
a turning box set in the wall of the convent; once the child in the box was turned, the child was
received by the convent and the parent could rest assured that the convent had received the child
and would care for him. See C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMI-
LY LAW 626-36 (2d ed. 1976).
90. FR. C. Civ. art. 381, para. 2.
91. FR. C. CIv. art. 372.
92. FR. C. Civ. art. 373-3.
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French Civil Code Article 373 lists four situations in which parental
authority may no longer be exercised conjointly. These articles provide a great
deal of assistance to the judge in cases of divorce and legal separation.93
Whenever the right to exercise one's parental authority is lost, the right to
exercise that authority devolves upon the other spouse. 94 Article 380 of the
French Civil Code provides that if the other parent is unable or unfit to exer-
cise parental authority, the child will be placed in guardianship and confided
to the authority of the National Social Services Office for Children in that
district (service dipartmental de 1'aide sociale a l'enfance) or to the care of a particular
guardian.-'
b. Divorce and Separation
Pursuant to recent reform, French courts no longer award custody solely on
the basis of fault in the case of divorce or separation.96 Under the former
legislation, courts were supposed to award custody to the parent who obtained
the divorce. 97 At that time, only the spouse not at fault for the break-up of the
marriage could obtain a divorce. Thus, it was assumed that the person against
whom a divorce judgment was rendered was at fault.
However, the elimination of the notion of faiit and the formal promulga-
tion of "the best interests of the child" standard actually do nothing more than
to codify the pre-existing jurisprudence. The new legislation provides that the
rights and obligations of both parents toward their children subsist after
divorce or separation. Under this legislation, courts award custody to one of
the spouses, or exceptionally, to someone else, in accordance with the best in-
terests (intirit) of the children.98
93. See FR. C. Civ. art. 373.
94, FR. C. Civ. art. 373-1.,
95. WEILL & TERI t, supra note 28, at 752; FR. C. Civ. art. 380.
96. Article 302 of the French Civil Code provided:
The children will be confided to the spouse who has obtained the divorce, unless the
tribunal, upon the demand of the family, or of the minisitrepublic, and in view of the in-
formation gathered in the application of Article 238 paragraph 3, finds the best interests
of the child require that all or some of them should be confided to the care of either the
other spouse, or of a third party. Author's translation.
97. Id.
98. Article 286 of the French Civil Code now provides: "The rights and the obligations of the
father and the mother with regard to their children, subsist after divorce, in accordance with the
following rules." Author's translation.
Article 287 provides:
In accordance with the interests of the minor children, their custody is confided to one
or the other of the spouses. In exceptional cases, and if the interests of the children so re-
quire, this custody may be confided to another person chosen preferentially from
among relatives, or, if that becoines impossible, to an educational establishment. FR.
C. Cxv. art. 287. Author's translation.
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French courts, even prior to the amendment of these articles, often ignored
the legislative mandate to award custody to the person who obtained the
divorce. Instead, the courts awarded custody in accordance with the interests
of the child. The judiciary ordered special investigations (enquetes sociales), con-
ducted by social experts, to help determine the arrangement which would best
serve each child.99 Articles in the new Code explicitly provide the judge with
this mechanism. Before the court makes a custody determination, whether
provisional or definitive, the judge may call for an investigation to obtain in-
formation relating to the material and moral situation of the family, the condi-
tion in which the children are living and are being raised, and the measures
that each parent would be able to take in the children's best interests. The
results of the investigation may be challenged by an interested party and the
court may allow a counter-investigation (contre-enquete).' 00
Prior to the reforms, the court, in a divorce suit, sometimes held that the
spouse at fault did not have the right to challenge the other spouse's right to
custody of the child. 1 However, the court usually permitted such a challenge
and would hear reasons why an award of custody to the parent technically at
fault would best serve the child's interests.10 2 French jurisprudence generally
held that judges, in determining custody, should decide what-would best serve
the interests of the children, notwithstanding any belief of either parent as to
the child's best interests. The court made such determinations in spite of the
former Article 302 requirement awarding custody to the one who obtained the
divorce. 10 Today, the terms of Article 287 of the Civil Code dearly indicate
legislative approval of the above-mentioned jurisprudence.
With regard to what is meant by the term "interests of the child," see comments following FR. C.
Civ. art. 287 (citingJudgment of Apr. 28, 1976, Trib. gr. inst., Nevers, [1977] D.S, Jur. 326
note Almairac). See also text accompanying notes 255-64 infra.
99. See cases and discussion cited in 2 M. PLANIOL & G. RiPERT, TRAnrr PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIvIL FRANcA ISS 652-57 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL & RIPERT]; 7 C. AUBRY &
C. RAu, DRorr CIVIL FRANAIS 5 481, no. 218 (7th ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as AUBRY &
RAU]; I A. COUN & H. CAPrrANT, Couts ELEMENTAiRE DE DROIT CML FRANQAIS 5 408 (11 th
ed, Juilloit de LaMorandiere ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as COLIN & CAPITANT; 3 MAZEAUD,
LEVONS DE DRorr CrIvL, tome 1, no. 1459 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MAZEAUD II]; de
Naurois, 56 REVUE CRTIQUE DE LGISLATION ETJURISPRUDENCE [Rsv. CRrr. Lo. ETJUR.]
460 (1936); [1959] Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D. Jur.] Chron. 179 note Donnier [hereinafter cited as
Donnier].
100. FR. C. CIv. art. 287-1. These social investigations cannot be utilized in any action
relating to the cause of the divorce. Id.
101. III ENcYcLo tDrEJuRtIDIQuE DALLOZ 1, Divorce, no. 603. (2d ed. 1970-1976) [hereinafter
cited as ENCYCLOPIgDIE DALLOZ].
102. Id. See, e.g. ,Judgment ofJuly 23, 1923, Cass. req., [1924] D.P. 172;Judgment of Feb. 5,
1900, Cour d'appel, Agen, [1900] D.P. II 324.
103. See, e.g.,JudgmentofDec. 15, 1896 [1897] D.P. I 421;Judgment ofJuly 11, 1904 [1906]
D.P. 1398; Judgment ofJuly 23, 1934, Cass. req., [1934] D.P. I 508; Judgment ofJan. 5, 1938
[1938] D.P. I 131;Judgment ofJune 9, 1939 [1939] D.P. 1 402;Judgment ofJune 4, 1940 [1940]
D.P. 1148; Judgment of May 18, 1943 [1943] Recueil Analytique,Jurisprudnce [D.A. Jur.] 50.
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This Article indicates that the judge has four options with regard to his
determination of custody: Custody may be awarded (1) to the father, (2) to the
mother, (3) exceptionally, to third persons or (4) exceptionally to educational
establishments. Yet, these options had long before been accepted by the
jurisprudence.I4 The Court of Cassation (1a cour de cassation), for example, had
consistently determined that the trial judge, in cases of custody, had complete
power to consider the issue of the best interests of the child and to award
custody on such a basis. 105 The purpose of the legislative changes was to
recognize these judicial developments and to facilitate the task of the courts in
determining what would best serve the interests of the children in cases of
separation or divorce.
Although the primary purpose of the articles governing custody and paren-
tal authority is to protect the children, the French Civil Code recognizes that
the parents themselves have interests in matters of custody requiring protec-
tion. Current Article 286, for example, provides that the rights and obliga-
tions of parents with regard to their children subsist in accordance with rules of
the Civil Code. Parental authority continues after divorce, but may be-revok-
ed, at least temporarily, for the parent who has not been awarded custody.10 6
The whole of parental authority, which subsists in the non-custodial parent,
may be re-established by court order upon proof of changed circumstances. 10 7
C. Effects of Separation and Divorce on the Right
to Exercise Parental Authority
Under the former French Civil Code, both parents retained all or whatever
part of the parental authority they had held prior to the separation or divorce.
Thus, the parent who was at fault for the divorce or separation, and who was
thereby deprived of his or her right to custody, would, nevertheless, retain the
power to exercise all of the other-attributes of his or her authority. Under the
See also other cases cited in ENOYCLOPIDIE DALLOz, supra note 101, at no. 1740.
The judge may take into account any agreements made by the spouses. The court may also
consider the wishes expressed by minor children once the judge has determined that the ap-
pearance of the children will not harm them. FR. C. CIv. art. 290.
104. Id. See, e.g.,Judgment of Mar. 31, 1908, Cass. req., [1908] D.P. 1 277;Judgment ofJuly
5, 1909, Cass. req., [1909] D.P. 1 496; Judgment of Mar. 22, 1922, Cass. req., [1922] D.P. I
159;Judgment ofJuly 27, 1931, Cass. req., [1931] GAZ. PAL. II 715;Judgment of May 18, 1943,
Cass. req., [1943] D.A. Jur. 50.
105. See cases cited in note 104 supra. See also Judgment of June 9, 1857, Cass. req., [18571
D.P. 1402;Judgment of May 11, 1858 [1858] D.P. I 285;Judgment ofJuly 17, 1959 [1960] D.S.
Jur., Somm. 17; Judgment of Dec. 15, 1965 [1966] D.S. Jur., Somm. 37; Judgment of Jan. 20,
1967, Cass. civ. 2e, [19671 D.S. Jur. 415; Judgment of Feb. 13, 1973, Cass. civ. ire, [1973]
Bulletin des Arrets de la Cour de Cassation [Bull. Civ.] I no. 51; Judgment of May 8, 1974, Cass.
civ. Ire,. [1974] Bull. Civ. I no. 154.
106. FR. C. Civ. arts. 378-381.
107. Id.
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old system of "paternal power," the father alone had the right to exercise
parental authority. Thus, if the prescriptions of the Code prior to 1970 were
followed faithfully, the mother may have been awarded custody with the father
retaining the exclusive power to make many decisions regarding the child's
rearing (i.e., where and how the child would be educated, the methods and the
approach to be taken in terms of the moral or religious education of the child,
ekt.).
French jurisprudence did not ignore the problems inherent in such situa-
tions. The courts intervened extensively in matters relating to the father's
right to exercise paternal power. These incursions went far beyond anything
that the Code drafters might have contemplated. 0 8 The courts sometimes
would provide the mother not only with physical custody of the child, but also
with the right to determine the education of her children and the power to ex-
ercise other rights which, if the Code were followed explicitly, might have re-
mained with the father. 0 9
. The new law, with its emphasis on spousal equality, provides both parents
with the power during their marriage to determine what is in the best interests
of the children. The Code provides that the paient who is awarded custody of
the children after a divorce or separation will have the right to exercise paren-
tal authority with regard to those children. 110 The new Civil Code articles ac-
cord the non-custodial spouse the right of visitation and the right of supervi-
siori."' Although this new system grants the custodial parent the right to exer-
cise parental authority, the non-custodial parent has the right to expect the
parent having custody to consult him regarding the child's education. The
non-custodial parent has recourse in the courts if he believes the other is not
properly caring for the child. 1 2 Moreover, when the custodial parent dies,
parental authority may be renewed in the surviving spouse. Indeed, unless
there are strong reasons not to do so, the custody of the child will be re-
established in the surviving ex-spouse.1 3 The perspective of the Code is that
108. WEILL & TERRt, supra note 28, at 723.
109. Id.
110. FR. C. Civ. art. 373-2, para. 1.
111. See FR. C. Civ. arts. 288, 373-2.
112. WEILL & T.RR, supra note 28, at 723-24.
113. FR. C. Civ. art. 373-3, para. 1, provides: "Divorce or separation does not prevent the
mother or father from acquiring parental authority as provided in art. 373-1, even for that parent
who, although having been deprived of the right to custody by a prior judgment, is capable of ex-
ercising such authority." Author's translation.
FR. C. Civ. art. 373-1, provides: "If one of the spouses dies or is found to be in one of the
situations enumerated by Article 373, the exercise of parental authority devolves in whole to the
other." Author's translation.
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the child's interests will usually be served best by both a continued relationship
with and participation by both parents in his rearing.
Authority for determining custody and the change of custody rests ex-
clusively with a judge sitting as the judge of matrimonial affairs. Of course,
the judge may always oppose any automatic succession of rights to the non-
custodial parent if he believes it will not be in the child's best interests."14
The right to custody includes the rights to fix the child's residence and the
right to have the presence of the child in the home. The child's domicile is
deemed to be with the person who has been awarded custody.' 5 The custodial
parent also has the right to supervision of the child, to control the relationships
of the child, to direct the child's education, as well as the right to the general
control of the child's person.1 6
Civil Code Article 288, as amended in 1975, provides that the spouse to
whom physical custody has not been awarded maintains his right to watch
over the caring and upbringing of his children. He is to contribute- thereto in-
proportion to his means. The non-custodial parent's rights of visitation and
access (hibergement) cannot be refused, absent serious grounds.1-"
1. The Right of Supervision (Surveillance)
Article 288 of the French Civil Code-provides that the spouse to whom
physical custody has not been confided retains the right of supervision over the
child's maintenance and education. Thus, the non-custodial-parent may have
a significant impact on the conduct, health and education of his chil-dren. 118
The term "education," as used in the Civil Code, has two connotations. The
first relates to the formal education of the child. In addition, the term- refers to
the moral and social upbringing. The term includes all that comprises the
authority of a parent to educate and raise one's child to become a mature,
114. WEILL & TERR#, supra note 28, at 725-26; FR. C. Civ. art. 373-3.
115. FR. C. CIV. art. 108-2.
116. See MAZEAUD II supa note 99, at 586; FR. C. Civ., arts. 286, 373-2. See also 119781 D.S.
JUR. Chron. 43 note Legeais [hereinafter cited-as Legeais].
117. It should also be noted that Article 288 also provides that the court may grant responsibili-
ty for the administration of the child's property to the parent who has not been awarded actual.
custody-
118. MAZEAUD II, supra note 99, at 587 n.3. The parent must also contribute to the child's
education an amount proportionate to the parent's resources. FR. C. Civ. art. 288. The non-
custodial parent does not, of course, retain exclusive power over the conduct, health and educa-
tion of his children. SeeJudgment of Feb. 23, 1971, La Chambre de ]a Famille du Trib. gr. inst.,
dited in Nerson, supra note 67, at 139.
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responsible adult.1 1 9 Even if the court awards custody to a third party, both
parents continue to oversee the child's education, unless the court rules other-
wise.120
The right of supervision was analyzed in an important decision by the
French Court of Cassation (court de cassation) in 1973.121 The Court of Cassa-
tion in that case reversed a decision of an appeals court which had approved
the award of custody to the mother, but had maintained in the father the ex-
clusive right to choose the establishment in which the children would be
educated. The court explained that the non-custodial parent does not possess
exclusive authority with respect to the children's education. The court stated
that the right to participate in the matter of the children's education must not
be allowed to be transformed into the right to meddle and interfere. 22
Disputes between custodial and non-custodial parents with regard to the
child's rearing and formal education may be resolved in court. A parent who
believes that the child's best interests are not being furthered by the conduct of
his former spouse may petition the court to determine what is in the best in-
terests of the child. In order to make this determination, the court will apply as
a standard the past practices of the parents. If no such guideline exists, the
court will decide on its own what would best serve the interests of the child. 23
Under French law, the decision of a tribunal relatng to the custody of a child
is not resjudicata. Rather, such a decision is'provisional. Thus, the spouse or
spouses not awarded custody, or even the ministre public, may, at any time,
petition the court to demand a modification of an earlier custody decision. The
party bringing the new action must allege that a change of circumstances war-
rants such a modification. 124 However, change of custody is difficult to obtain
because courts consider change, in itself, as inimical to the child's well-being.
119. Seegeneral PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 99, at $ 654; AUBRY & RAU, supra note 99, at 5
481, no. 221; 3 BEUDANT & LEREBOU s-PIGEoNNik.E, DRorr INTERNATIONAL PRIvt no. 879
(3d ed. 1970); COLIN & CAPrrANT, supra note 99, at no. 10522; 1 G. RIPERT &J. BOULANGER,
TRAitr DE DRorr CIVL. S 2278 (1956); MAZEAUD II, supra note 99, at no. 1495; 1 G. MARTY &
P. RAYNAUD, DROrr CIVIL no. 328 (1956). See also other authorities cited in ENCYCLOPIE
DALLOZ, supra note 101, at no. 1809. (Article 288 is based on former Article 303.)
120. FR. C. Civ. art. 373-2. It is interesting to note that Article 373-2, paragraph 1, only men-
tions the right of visitation and supervision. It provides that "if the father and the mother are
divorced or judicially separated, parental authority is exercised by the one to whom the tribunal
has awarded physical custody of the child, except for the right of visitation and of supervision
belonging to the other." Paragraph 2 of Article 373-2 addresses the rights that remain in the
mother and the father when custody has been awarded to a third party. See Legeais, supra note
116.
121. Nerson, supra note 67, at 139.
122. Id. at 139.
123. FR. C. Civ. art. 372-1.
124. WEILL & TERRt, supra note 28, at 724-25; FR. C. Civ. art. 291. Venue is determined on
the basis of where the parent who has been awarded custody resides.
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Prior to 1970, French jurisprudence established two separate lines of
analysis to determine who should have the right to control the child's educa-
tion after divorce. The first, represented by an 1866 decision from the tribunal
civil of Lyon, viewed such right as an attribute of "paternal power," which re-
mained vested in the father, even though custody had been awarded to the
mother. The father was allowed to retain the right to make all decisions
relating to his children's education, including their moral or religious educa-
tion. This power was maintained solely on the basis of paternal status. Only
through evidence of abuse could the father's prerogative be circumvented. 25
The opposing line of cases, on the other hand, perceived the right to control
the education of one's children as an accessory right to that of physical
custody. These decisions held that in case of disagreement or dispute between
the father and the mother, the will of the person who had legal custody would
prevail. The parent who had been awarded custody was charged-with guiding
the spiritual and religious development of the child.1 26
Notwithstanding the diverse opinions of the lower courts, the French Court
of Cassation has applied what may be described as a "best interests of the child
standard" in its determinations relating to the education and rearing of the
child. The Court of Cassation has reasoned that the authority to determine the
education of the child belongs first to the parent who has been awarded
custody over that child. However, judicial decisions relative to the exercise of
parental authority may be supplemented or modified upon demand of a
spouse, family member, or the ministere public.127 The Court of Cassation has
maintained that the judiciary will have ultimate authority to determine what
will be in the best interests of the child whenever there is a dispute between
parents.
As early as 1857, the court held that the-father, although he had not been
awarded custody, could exercise his right of supervision over the education of
his children, especially with regard to the religious education. 12 In that case, a
Protestant mother was awarded custody of her children, who were Catholic,
on the condition that the children be raised in the Catholic faith. The court
held that if the mother in any way abused or undermined her children's faith,
the father had clear recourse in the civil court to obtain not only the re-
establishment of the religious training, but even a modification of the judg-
ment of custody. In a 1919 case, a dispute arose between a child's mother,
who wanted the child to attend the French Naval Academy, and the child's
125. SeeJudgment of Mar. 10, 1866, Trib. pr. inst., Lyon, [18671 D.P. 11196 and other cases,
cited in ENCYCLOPfItDE DALLOZ, supra note 101, at no. 1833.
126. Id. See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 13, 1937, Cass. civ., [1937] D.P. 1281. See aLsoJudgment
ofJan. 6, 1948, Trib. pr. inst., Brianqon, [1948] D. Jur. 579 note Carbonnier.
127. This jurisprudential development is now articulated in FR. C. Civ. art. 291.
128. Judgment ofJune 9, 1857, Cass. civ., [1857] D.P. 1 401.
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father, who wanted the child to attend St. Cyr, the French military academy.
Although the father had custody of the child, the mother was allowed to exer-
cise her right of supervision by challenging the father's right before the court.
The court, in turn, based its decision on the best interests of the child.' 2 9 In
1937, the French high court determined that the best interests of a child were
.not promoted, even where there was no specific dispute, if the custodial spouse
denied the non-custodial spouse input into the education of the child. 13 0
Thus, the Court of Cassation has, over the years, considered the interests of
the children to be best served when both parents continue to participate in the
child's education. This view continues today. Indeed, even if the custody of
the child has been awarded to a third party, both parents are entitled to con-
tinue to exercise their right of control over 'their child's education unless the
court has expressly ruled otherwise.13'
2. The Rights of Hibergement, Correspondence and Visitation
The verb hiberger is defined in the Dictionaoi of the French Academy as "to
receive at one's home, to lodge, and to nourish."132 Civil Code Article 288,
paragraph 2, provides the non-custodial parent with the rights of visitation
and hibergement. These rights can be refused only upon indications of unfitness
or other cause for forfeiture as discussed above.
The rights of hibergement and visitation are seen by French jurisprudence to
include such rights as (1) the right of correspondence, (2) the right of both
parents to enjoy the presence and the love of their children, even though both
may not have the right to continuing custody, and (3) the right to enjoy the
presence of one's children during special occasions such as holidays or during
the annual vacation. Indeed, when parents take vacations at the same time of
year, as is common in France, the courts have required alternating presence of
the children.133
There is little substantive difference between the right of hibergement and that
of visitation. The essence of the two rights is that both parents, whether or not
they have custody, may nourish and care for their children, at least during cer-
tain portions of each year. The Code recognizes that the child requires a rela-
tionship with both parents.
The parent who has not been awarded custody also has the right to correspond
with his or her children without any interference from the other parent.13 ,
Under the former regime based on paternal power, the father had the right to
129. Judgment of Apr. 14, 1919, Cass. req., [19191 D.P. 1 59.
130. Judgment of Apr. 13, 1937, Cass. civ., [19371 D.P. 1281.
131. See FR. C. Civ. arts. 288, 286-295, 373-2.
132. II DICTIONNAIRE DE L'ACADAMIE FRANCAISE (8th ed. 1935).
133. Judgment ofJuly 3, 1978, Cass. civ. Ire, Versailles, [19791 GAZ. PAL. II, 49.
134. Judgment ofJune 7, 1899, Cour d'appel, Rouen, [1900] D.P. II 287.
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examine correspondence sent to his child by the child's mother, and in the
child's best interests, hide from the child certain details of the mother's con-
duct that the child "ought to be able to ignore." 135 This situation appears to
remain possible under current French law. 136
The right of visitation is not defined in the French Civil Code. Essentially,
the jurisprudence considers visitation as a right to maintain direct and per-
sonal relations with one's child. It is the right to meet, visit with, see or receive
one's child. Visitation does not include the right to lodge one's child, as such
right is embraced within the notion of hibergement.137
Just as the right of supervision applies as a matter of law to both parents, in-
cluding the parent who has not been awarded custody of the child, the right of
visitation is established in the Civil Code as a reciprocal right and
obligation.1 3e It is the obligation of the parent who has been awarded custody
of the child to establish, in cooperation with the other parent; the effectuation
of this right.139
The approach of most judges in France, with regard to visitation and
hibergement, is to require the parents to agree on thetime, place, and frequency
of visits and vacations. 140 If the parents fail to agree, the court will apply its
sovereign power to determine what- the interests of the child dictate. 14' This
approach is based on Article 247, paragraph 4, and Article 289 of the French
Civil Code. Because the French Civil Code regards the rights of visitation,
supervision and correspondence as matters of substantive parental authority,
the courts are not reluctant to require divorced parents to work out the ar-
rangements for the exercise of their joint authority. If one parent interferes
with the other parent's exercise of these substantive rights, 142 the aggrieved
parent can seek judicial enforcement of this obligation or can seek forfeiture,
or even damages.1 43
135. Judgment ofJuly 9, 1913, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1915] D.P. II 54.
136. See ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOz, supra note 101, no. 1829.
137. See Guiho, [1952] J.C.P. 1963; [1965] D.S. Jur., Chron. I note Guiglaris; [1967] D.S.
Jur., Chron. 183 note Falconetti; ENCYCLOPIIDIE DALLOZ, supra note 101, at nos. 1814-26.
138. FR. C. Civ. art.,373-2.
139. See, e.g.,Judgment ofJuly 24, 1878, Cass. req., [1878] D.P. 1 471;Judgment ofJuly 16,
1888, [1889] D.P. 1456; Judgment of Mar. 14, 1938, Cass. civ., [1938] D.P. 1243.
140. See, e.g.,Judgment ofJuly 30, 1901, Cour d'appel, Grenoble, [1903] D.P. II 61.
141. See Judgment of Dec. 29, 1924, Cass. req., [1926] S. Jur. 132; Judgment of Jan. 21,
1925, Cass. civ., [1925] D.P. I 99; Judgment of Oct. 4, 1978, Cass civ. 2e, [1978] Bull. Civ. I
158. For a United States court decision requiring consent of the non-custodial parent in major
decisions regarding the child of the dissolved marriage, see Van Nortewick v. Van Nortewick, 87
Ill. App. 2d 55, 230 N.E.2d 391 (1967).
142. At common law, the system of rights arid duties arises from the specific fact situation.
Thus, the focus is on the specific relationship of the parties, rather than the substantive status of
the parties. See POUND, supra note 47, at 21; LrrVINOFF, supra note 63, at 5-6.
143. See FR. C. Civ. arts. 293-295, 300, 371-2, 378-380. But see Spencer v. Terebello, 373
So.2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), where a Louisiana court, under similar circumstances,
awarded damages for violation of an obligation.
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a. Forfeiture of These Rights
Courts can, of course, deny the parents all rights of visitation, hibergement or
correspondence, just as the courts are empowered to withdraw all parental
authority.1 44 Under Article 288, paragraph 2, such forfeiture occurs only if
there are serious grounds. Jurisprudence prior to the reform had, in fact,
adhered to the same practice. 145 Thus, visitation rights have been denied by a
court when the father has failed to meet support and educational needs of his
children for an extended period of time. 146
Like all other decisions relating to the exercise of parental authority, those
relating to the right of visitation and hibergement may be modified at any time
by the courts upon the demand of a parent, a member of the family or the
ministire public.14 7 In one case, an abuse of custody was found where a father,
who had been awarded custody, emancipated his child in order to eliminate
his ex-wife's continuing authority over the child. The judge determined that it
was an abuse of the father's right, pursuant to his parental authority and his
right to custody as awarded to him by the court, to emancipate his child for
this purpose.148
144. The court generally has a great deal of flexibility in fashioning a remedy appropriate to
the situation. For example, a court may order a newly married non-custodial parent to exercise
his right of visitation in the home of a third party. See, e.g.,Judgment ofJan. 5, 1938, Cass. req.,
[1938] D.P. I 131;Judgment of Mar. 17, 1923, Trib. gr. inst., Seine, [1923] D.P. 19. The court
may remove such prohibition of the visit and hebergement of one's child in one's new household
once the mother or the father marries his or her adulterous paramour. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec.
17, 1964, Cour d'appel, Bordeaux, [1965] D.S. Jur. 144-45 note Savatier. (This case, however,
has been severely criticized by Professor Desbois. See Desbois, REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 332 (1965)).
Courts have also approved visitation rights conditioned upon the promise of a parent that he or
she will not take his or her children outside French territory. SeeJudgment ofJan. 12, 1972, Cass.
civ., [1972] D.S.Jur., Somm. 90.
145. See, e.g.,Judgment of May 15, 1972; Cass. civ., [1972] D.S.Jur., Somm. 165.
146. Judgment of Apr. 23, 1971, Cass. civ. 2e, [1972] Bull. Civ. II 110. One court of appeal
has held that the father must forfeit his right of visitation and hbergement if an expert shows that
the relationship with the father is traumatizing the child in any way.
147. FR. C.'Civ. art. 291. E.g., Judgment of Mar. 23, 1976, Trib. gr. inst., Toulouse, [1976]
J.C.P. 1118456 note Lindon.
148. Judgment of Feb. 5, 1957, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, [1957] J.C.P. 119988 note E.N. The
ruling was made on the basis of Article 477. See FR. C. Civ. art. 477. The case was decided prior
to the Law of Dec. 14, 1964, [1964] Journal Officiel de ]a Rdpublique Franqaise [J.O.] 11140,
which amended Article 477 so as to make such a practice impossible. The amended law provides:
[Tihe minor, even though unmarried, may be emancipated after he has reached the age
of sixteen years. This emancipation will be pronounced, if there are just reasons for do-
ing so, by the judge, upon the demand of one or both parents. When the demand is
presented by one of the parents alone, the judge will decide, after having heard the
other parent, unless the other parent is unable to communicate his wishes.
Id. Author's translation.
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b. Criminal Violations
The French legal system provides one additional sanction to ensure the
cooperation between custodial and non-custodial parents. It is a criminal of-
fense if the custodial parent interferes With the non-custodial parent's right of
supervision, visitation or hibergement.149 A custodial parent who refuses to allow
the father or the mother of a deceased parent to exercise their proper visitation
rights has likewise committed an offense. 150 Reciprocally, if the spouse entitled
to visitation or hibergement rights acts in a manner inconsistent with the rights
of the spouse having custody (i.e., by removing the children from the jurisdic-
tion in an attempt to gain physical custody himself) he or she has violated the
law. -51 It is also an offense under Article 357 of the Penal Code for either the
custodial or non-custodial parent to exercise any influence detrimental to the
authority of the other parent over the child (i.e., encouraging disobedience,
refusing to cooperate-with the other spouse, or persuading the child to refuse
the other spouse his or her right of visitation or hibergement).15 2
D. Evolution of "The Best Interests of the Child" Standard
1. Initial Evolution
French courts today resolve any dispute regarding parental authority that
parents are unable to resolve themselves. In making a resolution the courts use
"the best interests of the child" standard. This approach evolved over several
centuries. In ancient Roman and French written law, family relationships
were dominated by the head of the family, namely, the father. Family law was
an amalgamation of rights and powers conferred on the head of the family to
allow him to protect his family. According to at least one authority, this ar-
rangement was essentially political.1 53 The authoritarian system- then in power
conceived of familial relations as a means of protecting the social cell that was
the embryo of the village, the town, the city and the state. The family was the
backbone of the political structure and reflected and promoted authoritarian-
ism. Nevertheless, at certain times and on certain subjects, the system accom-
modated reform for the protection of children. The Digest of the French Civil
Code promulgated the famous maxim: infans conceptus pro nato habetur. Indeed,
149. FR. C. Cv. art. 372-2, para. 2. See also Judgment of Oct. 19, 1935, Cass. crim., [1937]
D.P. 112 note Lebrun; Judgment of Oct. 27, 1928, Trib. gr. inst., St. Quentin, [1928] D.P. II
602.
150. Judgment of Dec. 30, 1933, Cour d'appel, Angers, [1934] D.P. II 57 note Lebrun.
151. Compare Judgment of Nov. 6, 1936, Cass. crim., [1936] D.P. I 5, with Spencer v.
Terebello, 373 So.2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
152. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1951, Cass. crim., [1952] D. Jur. 107.
153. See Donnier, supra note 99.
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from the beginning, the Civil Code and the laws that followed incorporated
the term "benefit .of the children" (avantage des enfants) as the standard for
courts to use in resolving certain custody problems. For example, Article 302
6f the original Civil Code, relating to the award of custody to one of the
parents after divorce, utilized this terminology.15" However, until reforms
were adopted beginning in 1965, this approach was exceptional; rather, family
law under the Civil Code generally consisted of a set of rights accorded to the
father in order to protect the cohesiveness of his family.
2. Maternal Preference
After the decline of paternal preference in matters of custody after divorce,
the courts usually awarded custody to the mother. Although French legislation
has never had an express "maternal preference" rule, the general practice of
the courts has been to award custody to the mother after divorce
proceedings. 155 Article 302 required a judge to award custody to the spouse
who was not at fault. Nevertheless, the Article also provided that the court
could award the child to the offending spouse or to a third person if the court
found such an award to best serve the interests of the child. As the mother-
child relationship became increasingly important during the 19th century,
maternal custody was increasingly thought to be in the child's best interests.
Accordingly, courts used the language of Article 309 to award custody to
mothers in most cases. 156 This "maternal preference" has continued
throughout much of the 20th century.' 57 Statistics show that since the reform,
French courts have awarded custody to the mother in 83 % of the cases. Prior
to the reform, the courts awarded custody to the mother in 60 % of the cases,
including cases in which the court found the mother to have been at fault for
the divorce. New Article 287 of the French Civil Code eliminates any mention
of the notion of fault as a criterion in custodial awards, and provides that the
judge must make his determination exclusively on the basis of the interests of
the child."58 It appears that the jurisprudence continues for the most part to
place custody in the mother, although the awards never have been automatic.
154. Id. See FR. C. Civ. art. 302.
155. Notwithstanding the de facto maternal preference that developed, the concept of "patcr-
.nal power" continued to have an impact under the Code, as the father maintained his power of
control over the children, even when the court did not award custody to him. ENCYCLOP9iDIE
DALLOZ, supra note 101, at nos. 1682-84. See, e.g., Judgment of Aug. 3, 1949, Cass. civ. 2e,
[1950] J.C.P. II no. 5473;Judgment ofJan. 30, 1952 [1952] Bull. Civ. 136. But .eeJudgment of
July 5, 1957, Cass. civ., [1957] D. Jur. 640; J. CARBONNIER, DRorr CML 217 (10th id. 1977).
156. Massip, La Reforme du Divorce, REP. No. 1975.1 at § 202 n.290, cited in Audit, Recent Revi-
sions of the French Civil Code, 38 LA L. REV. 747, 774 (1978).
157. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPIDIE DALLOZ, supra note 101, at nos. 1682-84; Judgment of Aug. 3,
1949, Cass. civ. 2e, [1950]J.C.P. 115473; Judgment ofJan. 30, 1952 [1952] Bull. Civ. 136. Con-
tra, Judgment ofJuly 5, 1957, Cass. civ., [1957] D. Jur. 640.
158. FR. C. Civ. art. 287. Article 287 provides:
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a. Exceptions to the "Maternal Preference" Rule
It is not difficult to find representative examples of the 17 % of the cases in
which courts awarded custody to the father. The court has considered the
"conscientious, solid, and responsible character of the father, as opposed to
the irresponsibility of the mother, with regard to the children" as the basis for
the decision.15 9 In one case, a Parisian mother, having lost custody due to her
instability, argued that the court should allow her to regain custody because
she had remarried and her life had become stable. The court denied her peti-
tion, stating that the father was a competent and- affectionate parent, and that
he presented his children with all of the guarantees of a good education and a
secure future. 160
In principle, the courts in France consider the moral protection of the child
as more important than the material protection of the child, as long as there is
a modicum of material well-being afforded by the parent who will provide the
greater moral protection. However, a Parisian court in 1959- held that,
although the mother was worthy in every way, her two young daughters ought
to be awarded to the father, pending divorce-proceedings. The court reasoned
that the father was in a better material position to provide for the support and
education of the children. 161 The court explained that as long as the financially
more secure parent will not present a moral danger to the child, it may be
preferable to award custody to that parent. In another case, the court found
that the professional occupation of a mother did not permit her to devote
enough time to her six children, and held that it was in the interests of the
children to award custody to the father, who was "capable in every respect,
with regard to their education and support."1 62
The discretion of the court is sovereign in determining the interests of the
children. In applying this discretion, the court may promote any sort of ar-
rangement that will best serve such interests. In several cases, the court has-
awarded custody to the father on the condition that the paternal grandparents
house the children. 61 Courts have awarded custody to the father on the condi-
tion that whenever he leaves France he will allow the paternal grandfather to
In accordance with the interests of the minor children, their custody is confided to one
or the other of the spouses. In exceptional circumstances and if the interests of the
children so require, this custody may be accorded, either to another person chosen
preferablyfrom among their relatives, or, if the above is impossible, to afn establishment
of education.
Author's translation.
159. Judgment of Feb. 10, 1971, Cass. civ. 2e, [1971] D.S.Jur., Somm. 127.
160. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1965, Cass. civ., [1966] D.S. Jur., Somm. 37. But seeJudgment of
Oct. 20, 1965, Cass. civ. ire, [1965] J.C.P. II No. 14444.
161. Judgment ofJan. 30, 1959, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1959] D.S. Jur. 97, Somm. 65.
162. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1967, Trib. gr. inst., Seine, [1967] GAZ. PAL. II 202.
163. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1965, Cass. civ. 2e, [1966] Bull. Civ. II 546. See also [1966] Bull.
Civ. II 606.
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exercise the equivalent of paternal authority.' 64 The judge might award
custody to the father if the judge trusts the second spouse of the father, but
distrusts the second spouse of the mother. If the judge fears that the child of
the first marriage will be neglected among the children of the second marriage
of the mother, he also might award custody to the father.' 65
Although the courts award the mother custody in 83% of all cases, the
fathers, according to some observers, are satisfied with the decisions.' 66 The
men "understand" that the judicial practice is founded in reason and on the
fact that maternal custody is the "most sensible solution.'
'167
b. Operation of the "Maternal Preference" Rule
The decisions awarding custody to the mother are predictable. Generally, if
the mother can demonstrate to the court that she is competent and responsi-
ble, and if the children are of a "tender age," the courts will grant custody to
the mother. If at least one of several children is young enough to require the
care of the mother, the court often finds it to be in the children's interest to
keep them together in "a normal family" with the mother.'68 The tribunal de
grande instance of Nevers made a prototype decision in 1976. After the 1975
divorce of the parents, the court awarded custody of the minor daughter of the
marriage to the mother while custody of two older sons was awarded to the
father. Subsequently, the eldest of these sons left the father's home to go live
with his mother. The mother then brought an action for the modification of
the custody award. The court was confronted with the following questions: (1)
whether or not the defacto custody of the eldest son, now with the mother,
ought to be legitimized under the law; and (2) whether or not the younger son,
who was still with the father, ought to be required to live with the mother in
order to remain close to his. brother. The judges answered both of these ques-
tions in the affirmative on the basis of information received from the social in-
vestigation.' 69
Custody is not automatically denied the mother if she lives with a man to
whom she is not married.' 70 Often in such cases, custody will be awarded to
the mother on the condition that she marry.'' If the mother continually
164. Judgment of May 3, 1972, Cass. civ., [19721 Bull. Civ. 1107.
165. ENCYCLOPJ DIE DALLOZ, supra note 101, at no. 1741.
166. M.A. GLENDON, FRENCH DIVORCE REFORM LAW OF 1976 24, 199, 222 (1976).
167. [19751 D.S. Jur. Chron. 115-22 note Carbonnier.
168. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1972, Cass. civ. 2e, [19721 Bull. Civ. 11 271; Judgment ofJuly 9,
1975, Cass. civ. 2e, [1975]J.C.P. IV 288.
169. Judgment of Apr. 28, 1976, Trib. gr. inst., Nevers, [19771 D.S.Jur. 326 note Almairac.
170. Judgment ofJuly 12, 1966, Cass. civ. 2e, [19661 Bull. Civ. I1545; Judgment ofJan. 30,
1952 [1952] Bull. Civ. 1 36; Judgment ofJuly 17, 1959 [1960] D.S. Jur., Somm. 17.
171. Judgment ofJan. 20, 1967, Cass. civ., [19671 D.S. Jur. 415.
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engages in questionable conduct or is seen as presenting a moral danger to the
child, she will not be awarded custody.1
72
3. Emergence of "The Best Interests of the Child" Standard
Thus, the courts look to the existing relationship between the parent and the
child in order to determine what will best serve the child's interests. For exam-
ple, custody has been awarded to the mother upon a showing that the father
was frequently called out of France by his work;. it has been awarded to the
mother when she has organized her professional life around her children's
schedule in order to allow her to keep a close watch over the children's health,
education, work and leisure, thus allowing her to maintain a "happy" rela-
tionship with them. 173
Professor Almairic, in a note for a decision from the tribunal de grande instance
of Nevers, discussed the judiciary's attempt to define what constitutes the best
interests of the child. 174 He indicated that the notion of "interest" (int'f) is
closely related to that of "attachment, beneficence, solicitude," and is "a sen-
timent that causes us to find all that is necessary, utilitarian, or agreeable."
The professor observed that the notion is so inclusive that perhaps no faetors
could be categorically ruled out. Professor Almairic suggests that the following
elements ought to be taken into consideration in order to determine what will
best serve the interests of the children: the courts generally consider the age,
sex and physical needs of the child; the-moral, intellectual and religious needs
of the child; the situation with regard to the moral and material well-being of
the parents; the educational background of the parents; and their ability to
respond to the child's needs. The courts are heavily influenced by the respec-
tive parents' availability and inclinations with respect to the child's everyday
rearing and general education-175 For example, in 1967, a Paris-court awarded
custody to the mother, at least in part, because the father's profession required
frequent business trips.176 Thus, at least with regard to the physical custody of
the child, French courts appear to make their determinations on a case-by-case
basis in a manner similar to that of courts in the United States.17 7 In at least
80% of the cases the French courts take a short cut by determining that it is in
the interests of the child to be in the custody of his mother. The effect of these
172. Judgment ofJan. 29, 1970, Cass. Civ. 2e, [1970] Bull. Civ. 1 31.
173. Judgment ofJan. 3, 1969, Cass. civ. 2e, [1969] Bull. Civ. 1 3.
174. See note 169 supra.
175. Id. See, e.g.,Judgment of Feb. 10, 1971, Cass. civ. 2e, [1971] Bull. Civ. 1134; Judgment
of July 3, 1974, Cass. civ., [1974] Bull. Civ. 11 179; Judgment of Nov..14, 1973, Cass. civ.,
[1973] Bull. Civ. II 234; Judgment ofJan. 3, 1969, Cass. Civ. 2e, [1969] Bull. Civ. II 3.
176. Judgment of Feb. 7, 1967, Trib. gr. inst., Seine, [1967] GAZ. PAL. II 202. See note 169
Supra.
177. SeeJudgment of Dec. 11, 1964, Cass. civ. Ire, [1965] J.C.P. II No. 14155.
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decisions is tempered more so in France than in the United States, by the fact
that the non-custodial parent retains a significant amount of authority.
Article 290 of the French Civil Code now requires that ajudge consider the
following items: (1) agreements made by the spouses; (2) information obtain-
ed from the social investigation as well as from the counter-investigation; and
(3) the feelings and expressed interests or preferences of the child, as long as
the appearance of the child is necessary and will not present any difficulties for
him. Article 290 does not prescribe any limitation with respect to the age after
which a child may be heard concerning his preferences. In practice, the social
assistant of the court, during the investigation, will discuss the matter with the
child and recommend whether or not the court ought to consider that child's
preference. The Code does not require the judge to follow the recommenda-
tion of the social investigator or the preferences of the child."' 8
4. Modification of Custody: The "Double Burden" Rule
According to Professor Almairic, courts worry that a change of custody may
result in trauma and insecurity. For this reason courts have established the re-
quirement that there may be no intervention by the judiciary to change
custody of children except in certain limited situations. Courts often impose a
double condition upon the person attempting to modify custody. First, serious
events must have taken place in one or the other of the two homes since the
decision of the court awarding custody. Second, these events must be of such
an importance that they are susceptible of having detrimental repercussions on
the well-being of the child; such repercussions must be prejudicial to the
child's equilibrium or to his normal development. Both of these requirements
must be met for custody to be changed.' 79
Professor Donnier explains that the jurisprudence considers stability and
peace of mind of the child as major factors in the question of custody. Courts
are careful not to allow the child to become a pawn in the power struggle be-
tween parents. For example, in 1912, the Court of Cassation refused to allow
the parents to regain custody over their child from a foster family to whom the
Social Services Office for Children had awarded custody. The court rendered
this decision despite the fact that the parents had retained their parental
authority.1 0
178. See note 169 supra.
179. J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 217 (10th ed. 1977).
180. Gaudemet, 11 REv. TRIM. DR. CIV. 160 (1912). A similar notion was expressed by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in dicta in Wood v. Beard, 290 So.2d 675 (La. 1974), and by Justice
Tate in Paul v. Peniston, 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228 (1958), that if the parents forfeited their
authority or right to custody, the court may place the child, or allow the child to remain in the
custody of a third party. This same notion was expressed in the famous affair of Elizabeth Ire in
Paris, March 19, 1959. It represents, perhaps, an early understanding of the notion of the term
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In the famous Irr case, the court denied a father's request that he regain
custody over his daughter who had lived twelve years in a caring and affec-
tionate home.' 8' Thus, the French courts have developed a notion similar to
what is considered the "double burden" rule in Louisiana.182 This rule places
a very high burden on the part of parents or others who wish to change
custody, to show that the child's best interests are not being served in their
current home and would be better served in the home of the parents seeking to
change custody.
IV. LOUISIANA LAW RELATING TO CHILD CUSTODY
AND PARENTAL AUTORITY
A. Custody Incidental to Parental Authority
One of the basic notions of Louisiana law relating to persons is that many
rights and obligations- are established by and depend upon one's status as
spouse, parent or child.18 3 One of the most significant relationships is that be-
tween parent and child. Louisiana Civil Code Article 216 provides that during
the ongoing marriage, the child, until his majority or emancipation, remains
under the authority of his father and mother.18 4 Under this Article, the father
and mother have the right to custody of their chilfren; they have the right to
supervise and direct the care of-their children and to ensure their children's.
proper rearing, development, health and safety. 85
Article 216 also provides that if a dispute arises over the care or rearing of a
child, the father's will prevails.' 86 This langu age appears to indicate that if the
parents physically separate for some reason and if they both want to have
custody of the children, the father prevails and retains custody. However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Stely v. Montgomery'87 held that the mother could
prevail and obtain custody of her children in a habeas corpus proceeding dur-
ing the ongoing marriage.
In the Stelly case, the father argued that his wife's suit against him was
barred by immunity. As authority, he cited Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised
"psychological parent" used byJ. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, in BEYOND THE BEST IN-
TERESTS OF THE CHILD (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT].
181. Judgment of Mar. 19, 1959, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1959] J.C.P. II No. 1155.
182. R. PASCAL, LOUIsIANA FAMILY LAW COuRsE (2d ed. 1979) at 206-207.
183. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 24-27.
184. LA. CIV. CODE art. 216. This Article provides: "A child remains under the authority of
his father and mother until his majority or emancipation. In case of difference between the
parents, the authority of the father prevails." Id.
185. See R. PASCAL & K. SPAHT, LOUIsIANA FAMILY LAw, 359 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited
as PASCAL & SPAHT].
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 216. The French Digest proposed a similar solution, but this was re-
jected in the reforms of the Civil Code. See notes 90-98 and accompanying text supra.
187. Stelly v. Montgomery, 347 So.2d 1145 (La. 1977).
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Statutes, section 2911881 which, in 1977, proscribed suits between husband and
wife, except in actions for divorce, separation from bed and board, separation
of property and restitution of paraphernal property. However, the court
reasoned that the statute did not proscribe habeas corpus actions. Thus, the
language of Civil Code Article 216 and Revised Statute 9:291 notwithstand-
ing, the Supreme Court of Louisiana awarded custody to the mother. In 1979,
the Legislature amended Revised Statute 9:291 to include "causes of action
pertaining to custody of a child" as one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against suit by non-judicially separated husbands and wives. 1 9
Even before Stelly v. Montgomery and the revision of Revised Statute 9:291,
the State in its role as parenspatraie could institute a public proceeding pursuant
to juvenile or criminal legislation if the parent(s) neglected, abandoned or con-
tributed to the child's delinquency. However, such a proceeding took place
pursuant to public, not private, law and was designed to be determined in a
public forum.1 90
Parental authority is a primary substantive right in Louisiana. This right
includes the right of parents to have custody of their children. The legislative
188. Before its amendment in 1978 and 1979, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 9:291 provided:
As long as the marriage continues and the spouses are not separated judicially a mar-
ried woman may not sue her husband, except for:
(1) A separation of property;
(2) The restitution and enjoyment of her paraphernal property;
(3) A separation from bed and board; or
(4) A divorce.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9:291 (West 1961) (amended 1978 & 1979).
As amended in 1978 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:291 provided:
As long as the marriage continues and the spouses are not separated judicially, hus-
band and wife may not sue each other, except for:
(1) Enforcement of a lawful conventional obligation;
(2) A loss sustained as a result of fraud or bad faith in the administration of the
community propertyby the other spouse;
(3) Avoidance of an unauthorized alienation, encumbrance of lease of community
property;
(4) Judicial authorization to act without the consent of the other spouse;
(5) A separation of property;
(6) A separation from bed and board;
(7) A divorce; or
(8) Restitution of separate property.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. S 9:291 (West 1978) (amended 1979).
189. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9:291 as amended in 1979 provides:
Unless judicially separated, spouses may not sue each other except for causes of ac-
tion arising out of a contract or the provisions of Title VI, Book III of the Civil Code;
restitution of separate property; for divorce, separation from bed and board, and causes
of action pertaining to the custody of a child or alimony for his support while the
spouses are living separate and apart, although not judicially separated.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9:291 (West 1979).
190. See LA. CODEJuv. PRO. arts. 403-407; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. SS14:74-75.2 (West). See
also Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So.2d 217 (1972).
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basis for this right stems from a combination of articles in the Civil Code
which establish the rights and obligations between parent and child. 19' These
articles clearly establish parental authority in the father and mother over
children during the ongoing marriage. For example, Article 227 of the Louis-
iana Civil Code requires parents to maintain, support and educate their
children.192
A parent who has the right to exercise parental authority but who is without
custody for some reason may seek to establish his parental right and regain
custody of his child by bringing a habeas corpus action.' 93 Theoretically,
however, no non-parent has a right under the private substantive law to claim
the custody of an unemancipated minor so long as one of the parents retains-
his or her parental authority. 94 There are exceptions to this rule. The excep-
tions include: (1) an adoption agency to whom the child has been surrendered
for adoption; (2) a would-be adoptive parent of a child not surrendered, with
the consent of the parents, after an interlocutory decree of adoption by a com-
petent court; and (3) a person given custody of the child by a judgment of a
juvenile court after the child has been found to be delinquent, neglected or
abandoned. 95
B. Right of Biological Parent ta Custody
The rights and responsibilities relating to the parent-child relationship are
carefully established and controlled by the Civil Code. 96 Many such rights
and responsibilities turn on one's status as spouse, parent or child. Thus, the
Louisiana Civil Code accords the children of a valid marriage different rights
191. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE arts. 216-218, 220, 235, 237, which provide for the authority
which parents can exercise over their children. Cases recognizing such a primary right include:
Paul v. Peniston, 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228 (1958); Wood v. Beard, 290 So.2d 675 (La. 1974);
Stuckey v. Stuckey, 276 So.2d 408 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Lulich v. Lulich, 361 So.2d 451 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1978); Snell v. Snell, 361 So.2d 936 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Neal v. White, 362
So.2d 1148 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Crepple v. Thornton, 230 So.2d 644 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970). Similar rights are recognized in most other states. See, e.g., In re Hampton's Estate, 55 Cal.
App. 2d 543, 131 P.2d 565 (1942); Roche v. Roche, 25 Ca.2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944); Shea v.
Shea, 100 Cal. App. 60, 223 P.2d 32 (1950); Raymond v. Cotner, 75 Neb. 158, 120 N.W.2d 892
(1963); In re Mathers, 371 Mich. 516, 124 N.W.2d 878 (1963); In rejewish Child Care Assn., 5
N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959). See also Warburg, supra note 47, at 481 n.5. See generally
Comment, Louisiana Child.Custody Disputes Between Parents and Non-Parents, 25 LOYOLA L. REv. 71
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Custody Disputes]. See also notes 1-47 and accompanying text
supra, for a discussion of the philosophical, historical and conceptual background of this principle.
192. See generally PASCAL& SPAHT, supra note 185; Comment, Custody Disputes, supra note 191.
193. See LA. CODE CIV. PRO., arts. 3821-3831.
194. French substantive private law, however, provides for removal of parental custody or its
forfeiture in actions brought by third parties or the attorney general (apparently in his parens
patraie role).
195. PASCAL & SPAr, supra note 185. See also LA. REv. STAT. 9:404, 407, 422.1 & 429.
196. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 227, 246, 256.
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than it accords offspring born outside the traditional marriage relationship.
Differences in rights also arise according to whether or not the traditional mar-
riage is ongoing. The regime of parental authority obtains for parents and
children in the traditional valid marriage under Louisiana law,1 97 while the
regime of tutorship (guardianship) obtains for parents and children after
dissolution of the traditional marriage; such a regime also obtains where the
child is illegitimate. 19
The right to custody is considered to be inherent in parental authority. If
parental authority does not exist, as in the case of illegitimate children, the
regime of tutorship arises. All disputes with respect to custody in the regime of
tutorship are settled by reference to the Code. 9 9 An unemancipated minor is
placed as a matter of law under the tutorship of the surviving parent after the
death of the other. 200 If the mother and father of an illegitimate child have
acknowledged that child, the judge shall appoint as tutor the one who will bet-
ter serve the best interests of the child.20 If the father has not acknowledged
the child, or if the father has acknowledged the child without the mother's con-
currence, the mother of the child is, as a matter of law, his tutrix.2 °2 Upon the
death of the non-concurring mother, however, the father of the acknowledged
illegitimate child becomes that child's tutor, as a matter of law.20 Moreover,
since the 1979-1980 legislative session, there are no impediments to
acknowledgement, 20 4 rendering all biological parents capable of being tutors
of their children.
The tutor has the right to custody of the minor's person 20 s as well as the
obligation to rear the child properly. Rights and duties between tutors and
pupils in a tutorship are generally the same as those between parents and
children under parental authority.
197. See, e.g., articles cited in note 191 supra. Compare these articles, cited in id., with LA CIV.
CODE art. 256.
198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 256. In Louisiana, parental authority ends with the judicial separa-
tion of spouses or the dissolution of a marriage. Such authority never arises if the child is il-
legitimate. However, the regime of tutorship arises as a matter of law. Compare this with French
law, wherein parental authority applies to parents and children after dissolution of marriage, as
well as to illegitimate children and their parents. See notes 77-82 and accompanying text supra.
199. LA. CIV. CODE art. 256.
200. LA. CIV. CODE art. 250.
201. LA. CIV. CODE art. 256.
202. Id. The term "of right" used in Article 256 is taken from the French "dedroit," which ac-
tually means "as a matter of law."
203. Id.
204. LA. Civ. CODE art. 204 was repealed in 1979.
205. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 246. E.g., Neal v. White, 362 So.2d 1148 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1978).
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Thus, the natural parent whether under parental authority or under the
regime of tutorship, is considered to have rights superior to the rights of a
third party in a custody dispute. In Neal v. Wdite,20 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, in dictum, substantiated the right. of the biological parent to have
custody in a case in which the alleged natural father appealed the district
court's award of custody to the child's biological mother. The alleged father
had been in defacto custody of the child and had sought in a writ of habeas cor-
pus to obtain legal custody. The district court awarded custody to the mother,
because the plaintiff failed to prove he was the father of the child. The court of
appeals reversed the lower court and applied "the best interests of the child"
test. Although the mother's right was considered superior to the rights of third
persons, and although the father had not proved to a legal certainty that he
was the child's father, the State's rights were paramount. The State could
deprive the biological parent of custody whenever "the physical, mental, and
moral welfare of the child require[d) it. ' 207 The court found that where the
alleged father had cared for and had had physical custody of the child since the
child was six-weeks old (the child was four years old at the time of the hearing),
and the mother had had minimal contacts with the child, the mother had
"forfeited" her "superior right" even- as against third persons. The court ap-
parently believed that the mother only wanted the child back to secure welfare
benefits. Thus, the court applied "the best interestsofthe child" test after it
determined that the mother had forfeited her superior right. Custody, accor-
dingly, was awarded to the putative father.
C. Problems Retating to Custody Disputes Between Parents and Non-Parents
Parents and tutors have a superior right to the custody of their children and
pupils.20° However, their control over their children or pupils is not absolute.
Louisiana district courts have refused to award custody to parents who have
proved the existence of their parental authority, but who have -neglected or
abandoned the child. Such decisions have been based on the best interests and
welfare of the child.
206. Neal v. White, 362 So.2d 1148 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
207. Id. at 1149. See also Crepple v. Thornton, 230 So.2d 644 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
208. This is suggested by a close reading of LA. Civ. CODE arts. 216-218, 220, 227, 229, 235,
237, 246, 250, 256-257, 318, wherein the authority, obligation, and responsibility of parents with
regard to their children is established. See also cases; cited in note 191 supra. Other common law
cases which indicate a presumption in favor of the biologicil parent include, In re Guardianship of
Marino, 30 Cal. App. 3d 952, 106 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1973); Forrester v. Livingston, 216 Ga. 798,
120 S.E.2d 174 (1961); Melroy v. Keiser, 123 Kan. 513, 255 P.978 (1927); Exparte Bryant, 106
Or. 359, 210 P. 454 (1922), cited in Mnookin, supra note 46, at 240 n.65.
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1. "The Best Interests of the Child" Standard
In State ex rel. Paul v. Peniston0 9 the court held that although the mother and
father were fit to have custody of their child, the best interests of the child
would be served if the child remained in the custody of her aunt and uncle,
who had maintained defacto custody over a prolonged period of time. In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Tate stated that the better reason for giving custody to
the aunt and uncle was that the child's parents had forfeited their rights to
custody.2 10 Similarly, the court in Wood v. Beard211 suggested, in dicta, that a
district court in a habeas corpus proceeding may award custody to a non-
parent on two conditions: the award would have to be in the child's best in-
terests, and the parent would have to be unsuitable, unfit or otherwise unable
to care for the child. However, the court qualified this observation by holding
that a dispute between a child's parents and grandparents should not be
resolved by balancing the parents' and grandparents' respective abilities with
regard to care for the child. Such a resolution would not serve the best interests
of the child.212
Thus, in spite of the fact that the Civil Code's only two articles relating to
custody disputes21 3 address interspousal disputes, courts have applied "the
best interests of the child" standard to disputes between parents and non-
parents. This jurisprudential development is similar to the developments in
France, prior to the 1970 amendments to the Civil Code. 214
2. Permanent and Temporary Custody
Notwithstanding this last factor, the primacy of the parental right to custody
has led the jurisprudence to establish a presumption that it is in the best interests
of the child to place custody in the biological parent. Louisiana courts, like
French courts, favor parents over non-parents. The presumption is overcome
by proving unfitness, unsuitability or inability to care for the child. Thus, in
recent years, courts have approved the removal of custody from biological
parents and, conversely, the retention of custody by psychological parents,
when the former have forfeited their custodial rights. Barring proof of
209. 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228 (1958).
210. Id. at 232.
211. 290 So.2d 675 (La. 1974).
212. Id. at 677. It is interesting to note that even at common law, and it appears in Louisiana
specifically, that habeas corpus actions were not originally designed to determine custody, but to
relieve a child from illegal restraint. See R. HURD, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPus 458 (2d ed. 1876).
In practice, however, early American court decisions were similar to those recently decided by
Louisiana courts. See, e.g., State v. King, I Ga. Dec. 93 (1841), cited in Constitution &Family, supra
note 43, at 1223 n.157.
213. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 146, 157.
214. See notes 87-105 and accompanying text supra.
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forfeiture, unsuitability, unfitness or inability, "the best interests of the child"
standard is fulfilled by placing custody in the parent with legal authority for
custody.
Thus, the Louisianajurisprudence has approved, without a clear legislative
basis, the notion that a district court may award custody to a non-parent over
a parent. 215 The Louisiana legal structure under the Civil Code does not pro-
vide for removal or forfeiture of custody through private actions in the private
civil courts if legal authority for custody exists. Technically, it is up to the
state, in a public forum, to make such a determination on the basis of stan-
dardi determined by public lawY16
Nevertheless, in Studck v. Stuckey,217 the Second Circuit, following the lead
of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Paul v. Peniston and Wood v. Beard, aivarded
custody pendente lite to a child's grandparents who had de facto custody. The
court denied the mother's efforts to regain custody, stating that the mother
was unfit at the time to have custody of her .child. The Second Circuit panel
noted that the decision entailed only a temporary custody determination. The
court thus distinguished Stuckey from Griffith v. Roy, a case in which the Loui-
siana Supreme Court-had held that it was not appropriate for a civil district
court to remove custody from a parent to place it in a third party in an action
for neglect. 218 Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that. a mother,
if found to be unfit, could be deprived by the district court of her right to-tem-
porary custody.
This distinction was also the focus of a 1977 Second Circuit decision, Hall v.
Hall,21 9 in which the court reversed the trial court's decision to award perma-
nent custody to the grandparents, in the best interests of the child. In Hall, a
custody dispute had arisen between two parents. The grandparents were not
parties to the action and the disputing parents had not requested that the trial
215. Paul v. Peniston, 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228 (1958). See also Wood v. Beard, 290 So.2d
675 (La. 1974) (dictum). But see Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So.2d 217 (1972), wherein the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a suit to take custody of a minor away from a person who
under private substantive law-was entitled to custody, could only be brought in ajuvenile court as
a public action, by public authority and under public law, based upon the allegation that the
child had been abandoned, neglected or delinquent. Id.
216. Id.
217. Stuckey v. Stuckey, 276 So.2d 408 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).In this case the mother of a
child sought to regain temporary custody of her child from the child's grandparents; the appellate
court held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in awarding pendente lite custody to
the grandparents, based upon his belief that the evidence indicated that the mother was unfit to
have custody at that time. The court stated that the trial judge "acted solely in regard to what he
believe[d] ... [to be] in the best interest of the child .... " Id. at 411.
218. 263 La. 712, 269 So.2d 217 (1972). Giffith was further distinguished on the spurious
ground that the action was filed by the grandparents, whereas in Stuckey, the grandparents were
not before the court at all.
219. 367 So.2d 162 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
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court award custody to the grandparents. In reversing the lower court's judg-
ment, the court of appeals distinguished the temporary custody situation of the
SVuckey-case and held, significantly, that "the best interests of the child"
standard in Civil Code Article 157 contemplated only disputes between
spouses.
The distinction between temporary and permanent custody made by the Se-
cond Circuit in Hall and Stucky appears spurious. 220 The court in Hall based
its decision to award custody to the mother on the fact that the mother was not
unfit and had not forfeited her right to custody. The fact that the custody
would be permanent rather than temporary was not a deciding factor. Con-
versely, the basis of the decision in Stuckey was not that the custody would be
temporary but that the mother was unfit. 22
3. Forfeiture of Custody
One must focus on the notion of forfeiture in order to better understand
Louisiana law today. The cases of Hall v. Hall,222 Wood v. Beard122 and Paul u.
Peniston,224 signify a trend toward recognizing parental forfeiture of the right to
custody. Today, the courts may find it in the best interest of a child to award
custody to a non-parent. A court may divest a biological parent of custody
whenever the parent has forfeited that right by not exercising it without cause
for a long period of time, and by allowing someone else to become a
psychological parent. A court may also refuse custody to the biological parent
when the parent is unfit to have custody. 225 The existence of this trend should
not be confused with its theoretical validity under a strict analysis of the Civil
Code. 226
Only disputes between a husband and a wife were contemplated by the
Louisiana Civil Code. Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Lulich v. Lulich227 held that
220. Even though a decision awarding custody may be pendente lite pursuant to LA. CIV.
CODEart. 146, or "final" as under LA. CIV. CODE art. 157, it will never be "permanent" in the
sense that custody is always open to review upon changed circumstances. However, whether
pendente lite or permanent, it is always difficult to alter, as courts view change as damaging to
children.
221. 276 So.2d 408 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
222. 367 So.2d 162 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
223. 290 So.2d 675 (La. 1974).
224. 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228 (1958).
225. A court's transfer of a child from parental to non-parental custody or its establishment of
legal as opposed to defacto custody will not be allowed, if such a decision is based on a neglect
complaint or action by the non-parent; such a decision will be allowed, however, pursuant to a
parent's habeas corpus action. See Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So.2d 217 (1972); Stuckey v.
Stuckey, 276 So.2d 408 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Hall v. Hall, 367 So.2d 162 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979).
226. See PASCAL & SPAHT, supra note 185, at 207, 364, 476.
227. Lulich v. Lulich, 361 So.2d 451 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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"the best interests of the child" test applied under Article 157 only to the hus-
band and wife. Moreover, the court stated, if the husband and the wife are
believed to be unfit, the proper forum for awarding custody to a third party is
the public court, in an action brought by the state.228
The Third Circuit, however, in Girouard v. Halpn,229 determined that the
district court would not abuse its discretion by awarding custody to a non-
parent on the basis of the parents' unfitness and the best interests of the child.
The court of appeals held that a juvenile court would have exclusive jurisdic-
tion only if the child were currently in a state of neglect. In the Cirouard case,
the mother's step-sister, who had physical custody of the child, had previously
brought an action to obtain legal custody. In a summary proceeding to which
the mother acquiesced, the district court had awarded custody to the step-
sister. The mother then filed a summary proceeding to regain custody from
her step-sister. In approving the retention of custody in+ the step-sister, the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, relied on a footnote in Griffith v. Roy2 30 to hold
that the district court in the prior proceeding had jurisdiction to award custody
in the step-sister. Although the Griffith decision required that an "actiorr to
have a child declared neglected" be brought in juvenile court (a public
forum), this requirement was not applicable in an action for custody by a
parent or non-parent. The circuit court in Girouard also found that the
evidence clearly supportedthe trial court's finding that the mother of the child
was unfit to have custody. 231
The Third Circuit in Snell v. Snell,23 2 on the other hand, subsequently held
that the mother need not meet a "double burden" rule to regain custody of a
child presently in the custody of the child's grandmother. The Snell court,
citing Wood v. Beard,233 held that in a contest for custody between a parent and
non-parent, the parent is entitled to custody unless he has forfeited his or her
right, or is unfit or unable to care for the child. Unique circumstances may
warrant unique custody decrees calling for closer judicial supervision than
normally employed. 234
4. The Current Trend
The parent of a child has a right, superior to that of any non-parent, to
custody of the child. Furthermore, the jurisprudential trend in Louisiana is to
displace the parent's right to custody of his child only under exceptional cir-
228. Id. Accord, Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So.2d 217 (1972).
229. 368 So.2d 1139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
230. 263 La. 712, 269 So.2d 217, 222 n.5 (1972).
231. Girouard v. Halpin, 368 So.2d 1139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
232. Snell v. Snell, 361 So.2d 936 (La. App. Cir. 1978).
233. Wood v. Beard, 290 So.2d 675 (La. 1974).
234. Snell v. Snell, 361 So.2d 936 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978). See also Arnold v. Arnold, 376
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cumstances indicating the parent's unfitness or forfeiture. This trend has
developed notwithstanding the fact that the Civil Code articles relating to
custody disputes23 5 provide that custody should be placed in one of the parties
to the separation or divorce action.
This trend may be inconsistent with the theory and structure of the Civil
Code. The Civil Code system envisioned parental authority and tutorship as
aspects of private substantive law. The substantive law relating to persons
comprehends parental authority and tutorship, which include the right to
custody. 23 6 The state, as parens patrie, may, in neglect, abuse or abandonment
proceedings in public courts, deny and remove custody from a parent or tutor
who holds the substantive legal authority to a third party. 237 However, the
theoretical civilian distinction between public and private law should prevent
civil district courts from denying custody, unless the private substantive law
provides themwith such authority. 2 8 Notwithstanding the substantive struc-
ture, the jurisprudence appears to have rec6gnized some authority in the civil
district courts to deny or remove parental custody, and parental or tutorial
authority, upon a finding of unfitness or other type of forfeiture. This trend
may represent a judicial reaction to the difficulty of meeting the public law
standard for proving neglect, abandonment or delinquency. Nevertheless, the
trend is consistent with the law in common law jurisdictions and with the
development of the law in France, although the French Parliament has
recognized the trend and given it legislative' sanction.7 9 The Louisiana courts
appear to have adopted, without expressly stating, the notion of the
"psychological parent," promoted by psychoanalysts Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit.240 Apparently, if the biological parents have allowed their child to re-
main with a third party for a significant period of time so that the child is emo-
tionally attached to the new parents, the courts may consider the biological
parents to have forfeited their parental authority.
D. The Development of the "Maternal Preference" Rule
Civil nations have long recognized the biological parent's natural right to
the custody of his or her children. In 1888, the Louisiana Legislature accorded
the biological mother legislative preference over the biological father in
So.2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Bordelon v. Bordelon, 381 So.2d 871 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980).
235. PAScAL & SPAHT, supra note 185 at 206-207.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The French Civil Code provides the French counterparts to our district courts with this
authority. See FR. C. CIv. art. 287-288, 378-381.
239. Id. See notes 87-105 and accompanying text supra.
240. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 180.
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custody disputes. Prior to this time, Civil Code Article 146 had mandated a
preference in favor of the father. This paternal preference, which was a legacy
of Louisiana's Roman heritage, was based on the notion that the father as
patriarch of his family was the proper person, during the ongoing marriage, to
decide disputes regarding child rearing and custody. 241
The evolution from a paternal to a maternal preference in custody pro-
ceedings was grounded in the religious and cultural perception that the correct
person to care for a child was the child's mother. A man's abilities to rear
children came to be considered inferior to a woman's abilities, and the courts
recognized custody as part of the "essential nature of [a mother's] maternal
role. ' 242 The United States Supreme Court, in Bradwell a. Illinois,243 affirmed
the maternal preference. The Court stated:
The constitution- of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. .. The paramount destiny and
mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother. This is the law of the Creator 44
Thus, the mother was considered to be the correct person to raise her children.
Before long, a mother was considered to have a right to custody of her children.
In recent years, the concept of "the best interests of the child" has evolved
in Louisiana, as in other states, as an appropriate and possible alternative
basis for determination of child custody. 245 However, even with the recogni-
tion that the child's best interests should control in a determination of custody,
the presumption that the mother best serves those interests has allowed for
little, if any, deviation from the "maternal preference" rule.2 46 For example,
until 1977, Civil Code Article 157,247 provided that custody should be
awarded to the party who obtained the divorce. In spite of this express
language, however, the provisional preference for the mother articulated in
241. Paternal preference and control was also part of the Anglo-American and Germanic
traditions. See notes 1-46 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, Child Custody: Preference to the
Mother, 34 LA. L. REV. 881 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preference to the Mother].
242. Id.
243. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
244. Id. at 141.
245. E.g., Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 24-25, 258 So.2d 857, 859 (1972); Fulco v. Fulco, 259
La. 1122, 254 So.2d 603, 605 (1971); LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (amended 1977 & 1979); LA. Civ.
CODE art. 146 (amended 1979).
246. Although most states have eliminated the "maternal preference" rule (see, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE 9 4600 (West Supp. 1979)), in 37 states which have promulgated so-called equaliza-
tion laws, a de facto "maternal preference" rule actually exists. Roth, supra note 46, at 423.
247. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 with FR. C. CIv. art. 302. See note 96 and accompanying
text supra.
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the pre-1979 Civil Code248 extended to all custody proceedings. 2 9 Thus, the
presumption tracked the French presumption that the welfare of the children
was best served by granting custody to the mother. 20 Accordingly, Louisiana
courts consistently awarded custody to the mother, reasoning that such an
award best served the welfare of the children. The mother was denied custody
only if she was found unfit.25 ' The father was awarded custody only if he could
prove that the mother was "morally unfit. '
252
Occasionally, the preference for the mother's right was favored over the
child's need for stability. 253 For example, in Estes v. Estes,214 a mother sought
to obtain custody of her children from the father. Although the trial court did
not determine that such a change would serve the better interests of the
children, the Louisiana Supreme Court approved the lower court's decision to
award the mother custody. The court reasoned that, as a mother, she had a
greater right.2 55
E. Exceptions to the "Maternal Preference" Rule
The state has an interest in the extent to which a parent satisfies his child's
physical needs. However, the state, in custody determinations, requires more
than mere fulfillment of physical needs for food, clothing, shelter, affection
and education. The state, pursuant to "the best interests of the child" test,
also requires that the child be "taught by word and example the principles of
common decency and commonly accepted social and moral standards and
concepts.' '256
248. Prior to its amendment in 1979, LA. Civ. CODE art. 146, provided:
If there are any children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by
both the husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be
granted to the wife ... unless there should be strong reasons to deprive her of it, either
in whole or in part .... Id.
249 For a discussion of the similar development in French law, see notes 153-180 and accom-
panying text supra.
250. Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So.2d 603 (1971).
251. Id.
252. Id. See Vidrine v. Demourelle, 363 So.2d 943 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), where the child re-
mained in the home of mother. See also Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So.2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975), wherein the "maternal preference" rule was constitutionally upheld. The court noted that
for two reasons this rule is not "unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary," in violation of the Loui-
siana constitution. See, LA. CONST. art. 1, 5 3. First, it is a "simple fact that the day-to-day care
of minor children has traditionally, in our society, been in the hands of the mother rather than the
father." Id. Secondly the "obvious biological connexity" between the mother and child creates a
relationship, which in the court's opinion "gives ... a biological basis for the historical legal
preference given the mother in questions of custody." Id.
253. See Note, Preference to the Mother, supra note 241.
254. 258 So.2d 857, 859 (La. 1972).
255. Id.
256. Cleeton v. Cleeton, 369 So.2d 1072 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979). The Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed this first circuit decision transferring custody from the mother to the father even
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Under the "maternal preference" rule, the child's best interests, especially
when the child was young, were best served by awarding custody to the
mother, unless exceptional circumstances existed. The exceptional cir-
cumstances that would deny a mother custody included her physical or emo-
tional inability to care for the child. More commonly, custody was denied
because the mother was morally unfit. 25 7 Courts became preoccupied with
moral suitability, focusing on sexual promiscuity. Open public adultery for a
substantial period of time would constitute unfitness and would provide a basis
for removal from or denial of custody of the mother.2 58
In Monsour v. Monsour,259 the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that it
was primarily interested in serving the moral best interests of the child. Mrs.
Monsour, the mother of a nine-year old boy, had been awarded permanent
custody and had maintained a wholesome atmosphere in her. home for some
three or four years until she began to live with an unmarried male whom she
intended to marry. When her ex-husband filed process to have custody chang-
ed, the mother realized that the arrangement might be harmful to her son and
soon married her cohabitant. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the per-
son seeking to change custody bears a heavy burden of proving the present cir-
cumstances to be so deleterious to the child's welfare as to warrant removal.
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the mother's marriage to her cohabitant hadre-established an atmosphere
that would promote the child's best interests. 260
Nevertheless, past misconduct may, despite its reform, be an important
consideration in determining present suitability, even though custody awards
though the children were "happy, healthy, and well behaved," and even though they were doing
very well in school- Se Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383 So.2d 1231 (La. 1979). The Court stated:
The effect of conduct of this nature (open and notorious adultery over an extended
period in home while the children were present) instilled in the hearts and minds of
children of tender years by their mother cannot manifest itself until they attain a stage
in life where their physical state permits and they are called upon to decide what their
own standards of conduct will be. And if we accept, as we do, the premise that an open
and notorious adulterous relationship by the mother of children of tender years will in-
fluence those children in later life to consider such conduct acceptable, we must then
decide the effect in law of that standard.
[A]dultery of the mother, especially when it is open and public for a substantial
period of time, in total disregard of the moral principles of society, has repeatedly been
held to establish that the mother is morally unfit to maintain custody of her children.
Id. at 1233. The court distinguishes Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So.2d 603 (1971), on the
basis of the "calculated and continued public course of immoral conduct" condemned but not
present, in Fudco. Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383 So.2d 1231, 1234 (La. 1979).
257. Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So.2d 603 (1971).
258. Strother v. Strnther, 248 So.2d A67, 870 (La. 1971). See also Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383
So.2d 1231 (La. 1979).
259. 347 So.2d 203 (La. 1977).
260. Id. For a discussion of the resolution of similar problems in French jurisprudence, see,
e.g., Judgment of Dec. 17, 1964, Cour d'appel, Bordeaux, [1965] D.S. Jur. 144-45.
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are not considered punitive. Thus, in one case, 26 1 the mother was denied
custody upon evidence that she had, in the past, engaged in sexual activity
with three men, including once while merely separated from her husband and
once in the presence of her child.
In another case, 26 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court appeared to endorse
punishment for past misconduct. In that case, the court denied custody to a
mother who, seventeen months earlier, had engaged in a three-month affair,
even though she was otherwise found to be a good parent. 263 The Louisiana
Supreme Court found that a mother may be denied custody in favor of the
father or another who claims "lawful" custody when she engages in a course
of open and public adultery in defiance of accepted moral principles, com-
munity mores, and in disregard of the embarrassment and injuries she might
cause her children. 264 Justice Tate wrote a strongly worded dissent in which he
suggested that the court was looking past the best interests of the children in an
attempt to punish or reform the mother.265
F. The Decline of the "Maternal Preference" Rule
1. Constitutionality
The preference or presumption favoring the mother in custody decisions
has weakened for several years. First, the rule has been challenged on constitu-
tional grounds. 266 In 1975, the Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
the rule in Louisiana.2 67 However, the United States Supreme Court case of
Craig v. Boren268 limited, if not invalidated, the rule. In Craig, the Court held
that statutes which discriminate on the basis of gender will be overturned
unless they are found to be substantially related to "important state
261. Harrison v. Harrison, 359 So.2d 266 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
262. Schexnayder v. Schexnayder, 371 So.2d 769 (La. 1979); Cleeton v. Cleeton, 383 So.2d
1231 (La. 1979).
263. Schexnayder v. Schexhayder, 371 So.2d 769 (La. 1979).
264. Id. at 770. The facts that compelled this court to find the mother unfit, even though the
misconduct had long since ended were that she had met her "lover" at a car wash and had pro-
ceeded within a week to begin her illicit affair. Id. She would pretend to go play bingo, leave her
children with her mother-in-law, and go meet her paramour, "behind a school, behind a church,
or other such places" and then go to the hotel for sexual relations. Id. On one occasion, she park-
ed her car, walked across the parking lot and entered her paramour's van in which they proceed-
ed to the levee for sex. Id. The affair was notorious in the small community because of the parties'
indiscreet meetings, their difference in race, the open disregard for the embarrassment and injury
that the affair would cause her family, and their defiance of community standards. Id. The court
reasoned that when the mother is so openly in disregard of community mores and openly
disregards her childrens' feelings and care, she has failed to meet the standards required of a
mother in rearing her children properly. Id.
265. Id. at 777.
266. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
267. Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So.2d 236 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
268. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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interests." The Court applied a level of "intermediate scrutiny, ' 26 9 which
continues to be applied in the United States to gender discrimination cases. 270
2. Article 157 and the "Maternal Preference" Rule
Another drawback of the "maternal preference" rule is that, while it affords
the court a convenient tool for making custody determinations, the rule
prevents a thorough examination of the facts of each case, and often hampers
rather than serves the welfare of the children. 21 Dissatisfaction with the rule
has grown steadily.
In 1977, Article 157 of the Louisiana Civil Code was amended to read:
In all cases of separation and divorce, and changes of custody after
an original award, permanent custody of the child or children shall
be granted to the husband or the wife, in accordance with the best
interest of the child or children, without any preference being on
the basis of the sex of the parent. 272
Since the amendment, the Louisiana circuits have been split as to whether the
"maternal preference" rule has been abrogated or whether it continues in
some form.
The Second Circuit, in Hegan v. Hegan,273 and the Fourth Circuit, in Spencer
v. Talabock,274 have found the Article 157 amendment abrogates the "maternal
preference" rule. In Hegan, the father was awarded custody of his young child
because of the wife's adultery. Prior to the judgment and award of custody,
the father had been in physical custody of the child for several months while
the mother was away from the matrimonial domicile. Moreover, prior to this
extended absence of the mother, the father had on several occasions cared for
the child while the mother had been away from the domicile for medical care.
The trial court found the child to be happy, well adjusted, and well cared-for
in the father's custody. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment awarding
custody to the father, rejecting the mother's argument that the child should be
awarded to her unless she was found to be morally unfit or otherwise un-
suitable. The court construed Article 157, as amended, to eliminate any ab-
solute preference for the mother. The court stated:
269. Id. at 197. For a discussion of these equal protection tests as they apply to Louisiana
legislation, see Note, Louisiana's Presumption of Paternity: The Bastardized Issue, 40 LA. L. REv. 1024
(1980); Bilbe, Constitutionaliy of Sex Based Differentiations in the Louisiana Community Property Regime,
19 Loy. L. REv. 373 (1972). See also Constitution & Family, supra note 50.
270. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); See also Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979); Constitution & Family, supra note 50.
271. See Note, Preference to the Mother, supra note 241.
272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (amended 1977 & 1979).
273. 367 So.2d 147 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
274. 370 So.2d 684 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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We do not hold that a close natural bond between a mother and
child of tender years, if present, should not be considered in deter-
mining what would be best for the child. We admit, as stated by
this court in Brackman v. Brackman, 322 So.2d 314 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1975, that one of the many factors to consider in determining
the best interest of the children is the desire to continue them in the
care of the person who, in normal situations, has provided the
degree of continuous care and affection which creates such a close
bond that it would be harmful to the children to alter that relation-
ship by granting custody to the father. This factor should be con-
sidered, but should not be given such weight as to only be over-
come by a showing that the mother is unfit or unstable. 275
In this case, the court noted, the strong psychological bond existed between
the father and child rather than between the mother and child.
However, in Coltharp v. Coltharp,27 6 a different panel of the Second Circuit
reinterpreted new Article 157 as a possible codification of the "maternal
preference" rule. The court stated that it was in the child's best interests to be
placed in the custody of his mother at the time of initial custody determina-
tion. However, the court qualified this conclusion by adopting the
"psychological parent" doctrine, in preference to the strict "maternal
preference" rule, finding that the mother should be awarded custody when
she has been the person with the closest relationship to the child. The panel
reasoned that, because Article 157, as amended, prescribes "the best interest
of the child standard" for determining disputed custody and, because those in-
terests are best served by the mother in most cases, the legislature must have
intended to retain the "maternal preference" rule. 277 Nevertheless, custody
was actually awarded to the father on the basis of a modified "double burden"
rule. The father had been in defacto custody for sixteen months prior to the
custody hearing. The court found the "maternal preference" rule to be inap-
plicable in this situation, because the preference was designed to apply to in-
itial custody determinations following the separation of the spouses. The court
explained that:
The rule was designed to continue the custody of these young
children with the mother after the separation of the spouse because
it was to the best interest of these children that they remain subject
to the direct custody and control of their mother who had cared for
them prior to the separation. It may be that C. C. Article 157 ...
could be construed to have legislatively eliminated the maternal
275. Hegan v. Hegan, 367 So.2d i47 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). In this case the court, again,
was concerned about, and adopted without so stating, the notion of the "psychological parent."
276. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 368 So.2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
277. Id.
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preference rule since it provides that the child should be awarded
to the husband or wife in accordance with the best interest of the
children. The amendment to the Article probably makes no
change in the law since the maternal preference rule was always
based upon the notion that it was to the best interest of a child of
young and tender age to be placed in the custody of the mother at
the time of the initial custody determination. The rule has no ap-
plication to this situation where the father has been exercising ac-
tual custody over these two young boys for over 16 months prior to
this custody hearing. 278
Thus, the court here adopted the "psychological parent" doctrine. According
to this doctrine, custody is awarded to the parent who has developed the
closest relationship with the child. The mother is not necessarily given
preference.
3. The "Double Burden" Rule
a. Definition
While some panels of Louisiana circuits have, as in Coltharp, given custody
to the father while recognizing the validity of the "maternal preference" rule,
other courts of appeal have based their decision that custody ought to be given
to the mother simply on the basis of the "double burden" rule. This rule279
was jurisprudentially developed to protect the- best interests of-children. The
courts reason that, because it is not in the best interests of a child to be the sub-
ject of a court battle and because it may be detrimental for a child to have his
custody changed frequently, once awarded, custody should not be changed ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances. One seeking to change custody has been
required to prove: (1)-that the present environment of the child is detrimental
to his best interests and well-being; and (2) that the non-custodial parent is
able to provide an environment that will better serve the interests and welfare
of the child.
Prior to its amendment in 1979, Article 146 expressly provided for maternal
preference in temporary custodial awards. Application of this preference also
operated as a defacto award of permanent custody. When a final determination
of custody was made under Article 157, the courts usually awarded custody to
the mother because, under the "double burden" rule, it was considered
detrimental to change the custody of the child. Although the decisions ap-
278. Id. at 796. See also Doyle v. Doyle, 371 So.2d 344 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
279. See, e.g., Decker v. Landry, 227 La. 603, 80 So.2d 91 (1955); Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La.
1122, 254 So.2d 603 (1971). The "double burden" rule represents an evidentiary presumption or
common-sense predisposition that courts have adopted.
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peared to be based on "the best interests of the child" standard, the outcomes
were, in fact, gender-based. 280
b. Viability of the "Double Burden" Rule
Over the years courts have limited the application of the "double burden"
rule. For example, in 1976, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals28'
held that the "double burden" rule should apply only when the initial custody
award was a considered decree. Thus, if the initial decree was based on a
stipulation of the parties or was awarded in a default judgment, requiring that
the hearing to change custody be similar to an original custody hearing, there
would be no requirement that the parent seeking to change custody meet the
"double burden" rule.
In Hays v. Hays,282 the First Circuit noted that the "maternal preference"
rule had undergone significant restriction since the Fulco decision and the
amendment of Article 157. The court's opinion included a discussion of Mon-
sour v. Monsour,2 83 where the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a person
seeking a change of custody bears a heavier burden of proof only if a con-
sidered decree had been previously rendered in the case. In Hays, the mother
held custody pursuant to a stipulation. Thus, the father, who was seeking a
change of custody, was not required to satisfy the heavier burden rule. In-
stead, he only had to demonstrate that a change in custody would be in the
child's best interests. However, the court did prescribe a number of guidelines
used to determine a child's best interests. These guidelines included:
1. the experience of the child with the mother;
2. the rebuttable presumption that the interests of a child will be
better served by placing him in the custody of the mother;
3. "convincing evidence that the greater advantage of the child
will be better served by entrusting his care to the father."28 4
The circuits have not been internally consistent in their analysis of how the
"double-burden" rule should be applied. Even after the 1977 amendment to
Civil Code Article 157 the Second and Third Circuits held that defacto custody
was sufficient to trigger the application of the "double burden" rule, reason-
ing that it'simply is not in the best interests of the children to have custody
changed frequently. Nevertheless, in Myers v. Myers28 5 the Third Circuit con-
280. E.g., Hays v. Hays, 365 So.2d 563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Coltharp v. Coltharp, 368
So.2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
281. Stevens v. Stevens, 340 So.2d 584, 586-87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
282. 365 So.2d 563, 565 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
283. Id. Monsour v. Monsour, 347 So.2d 203 (La. 1977).
284. Id. But see Coltharp v. Coltharp, 368 So.2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
285. 370 So.2d 172, 174 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
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cluded that there can be no rigid application of the "double burden" rule. In
Myers, the father had been awarded custody of a minor daughter after his
divorce from his wife on the ground of adultery. The wife had filed an answer
to the petition for divorce, but did not appear at the trial. Shortly after the
divorce, the wife married her paramour, and then filed to gain custody of the
child. The trial court approved the wife's petition. On appeal the Third Cir-
cuit found that the Fulco decision had discarded- the "double burden" rule.
The court held that it was in the best interests of the child under these cir-
cumstances to award custody to the mother. Thus, a change in custody was
approved. The decision reaffirmed Bushnell v. Bushnell 286 which had held that
a mother seeking to recover custody of a child does not have to meet the "dou-
ble burden" rule.
Finally, in Harrison v. Harrison,2 7 the Second Circuit held that when a
pendente lite decree of child custody is awarded in favor of a child's mother three
years prior to the action to change custody, the party seeking a change of
custody bears the heavy burden of proving that the child's continued custody
with the mother would be detrimental to the child's welfare and best interests.
Thus, since the enactment of the 1977 amendment to Article 157, there has
been considerable confusion among the Louisiana circuits regarding the
"maternal preference" rule and the "double burden" rule.
4. Recent Amendments
The 1979 amendments to Civil Code Article 146, which eliminate the ex-
plicit maternal preference for pendente lite custody determinations, and the ad-
ditional amendment to Article 157 should clarify the conflicting case law.
Custody pendente lite determinations, like permanent ones, must now be made
to either parent.in accordance with the best interests and welfare of the child.
Although the reforms do not expressly proscribe a gender-based preference for
a particular parent, the deletion of the express preference for the mother ap-
pears to eliminate the presumption of a gender-based preference. Both Ar-
ticles 146 and 157 prescribe the "best interests of the child" test to determine
which parent should have custody. Article 146 provides that the court "shall
inquire into the fitness of both the mother and the father and shall award
custody to the parent the court finds will in all respects be in accordance with
the best interest of the child. ' 28 8 The same test now applies to permanent
custody awards and to changes of custody. 2 9
286. 348 So.2d 1315, 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1.977).
287. Harrison v. Harrison, 359 So.2d 266 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
288. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146.
289. LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (amended 1979). This article currently provides:
A. In all cases of separation and divorce, and changes of custody after an original
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The amendments thus appear to require that a custody decision be based on
a determination of which parent has the closer relationship with the child and
which parent will thereby better serve the physical, emotional and moral needs
of that child. The gender of the spouse seeking custody as well as the impact a
custody change might have on the welfare of the child may be considered rele-
vant factors, but neither consideration retains its status as a presumption.
award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the husband or
the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child or children, without any
preference being given on the basis of the sex of the parent. Such custody hearing may
be held in private chambers of the judge. The party under whose care the child or
children is placed or to whose care the child or children has been entrusted, shall of right
' become natural tutor or tutrix of said child or children to the same extent and with the
same effect as if the other party had died. Id.
B.(1) If subsequent to the granting of a divorce or separation one of the parties to the
marriage dies and is survived by a minor child or children of the marriage, the parents
of such deceased party may have reasonable visitation rights to the child or children of
the marriage during their minority, if the court in its discretion finds that such visitation
rights would be in the best interests of the child or children .... Id.
(2) If any provision or item ofthis Act or the application thereof is held invalid, such
invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items, or applications of this Act which can
be given effect without the invalid provisions, items, or applications, and to this end the
provisions of this Act are hereby declared severable. Id.
(3) All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed. Id.
The provisions of article 157 are mandatory. In addition, if there are no pending proceedings,
the court must award permanent, rather than temporary, custody. Barrilleaux v. Barrilleaux,
381 So.2d 518, 518 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). As amended in 1979, article 157 reflects a legislative
intent to terminate the "maternal preference" rule and to substitute a rule whereby the best in-
terest of the child would be determined on the basis of the relative fitness and ability of the com-
peting parents in all respects to care for the child. In fact, it is often in the best interest of the child
that custody be awarded to the mother. Thornton v. Thornton, 377 So.2d 808, 809-10 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1980). 1
In Thornton the father was awarded custody on the basis of the mother's erratic behavior and
testimony given by a psychiatrist who had examined her. Id. In another case, the father was
awarded custody because the mother was morally unfit, living in open adultery with a man in
such an unwholesome environment as to be grossly harmful to the moral welfare of her children.
Atteberry v. Atteberry, 379 So.2d 18, 20 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cer. granled, 381 So.2d 1231
(La. 1980).
With regard to the change of custody provisions of article 157, one court has recently held that
in order to have custody of a child transferred from a maternal aunt who has been rearing the
child to a situation where the child will be raised by one parent, it is only necessary to prove that
the best interest of the child will be served by this change in custody. See Arnold v. Arnold, 376
So.2d 528, 531 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). Article 157 states that either the husband or the wife can
raise the child, thereby terminating the "maternal preference" principle. LA. CIV. CODE art.
157.
A third circuit court has held that the 1979 amendment to article 157 abrogated the "double
burden" rule. See Bordelon v. Bordelon, 381 So.2d 871, 873 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980). The court
explained that the legislation was both interpretive and procedural and should be applied retroac-
tively. Id. Prior custody, however, will still be a factor for policy consideration as the underlying
notion of the "double burden" rule is the stability of the child's environment. The concurring
opinion in this case correctly concludes that this is a procedural rather than a substantive prob-
lem. Id. at 876: For a concise history of the "double burden" rule, see id. at 873. But see Shanklin
v. Shanklin, 376 So.2d 1036 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979); Lucien v. Lucien, 378 So.2d 518 (La.
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5. The "Maternal Preference" Rule in Other States
Many states have amended their laws to eliminate any presumption favor-
ing either spouse in custody proceedings. New York courts, for example, have
found constitutionally questionable the presumption that children of tender
years should be placed in the custody of their mother. One New York court
has found that "[l]egislative classifications ... may not be premised on
unalterable sex characteristics that bear no necessary relationship to the in-
dividual's need, ability of life situation." 290 This court held that the "materng
preference" rule for children of tender years is inconsistent with "the best in-
terests of the child" standard, which is required by the New York domestic
relations statute. In fact, the court held that "the best interests of the child"
standard was designed to eliminate any gender-based-presumptions. 2 91
The New York decision and the trend it represents reflect the goals of the re-
cent amendments enacted by the Louisiana legislature. Some social scientists
have indicated that enthusiasm for the trend ought to be restrained. These
writers argue that gender should remain a consideration, although not
necessarily a presumption, in custodial awards. According to this view, it may
not be in the best interest of the child to allow courts to disregard the gender of
the parents and the child in their determinations of custody. One authority has
stated:
[C]hildren must have adult models with whom to identify. Which
parent they need most will vary according to age and, of course,
acording to the sex of the child. It has become traditional for
mothers to be the parent of first choice for children below the age
of adolescence. This is psychologically sound, provided that the
mother is emotionally capable. With the onset of adolescence,
however, the like-sexed parent becomes more important since lear-
ning to become male or female is the principal psychological task
for that age group. This means that with boys there should be a
higher incidence of placement with fathers if the needs of male
children are to be met.292
App. 4th Cir. 1979). Schober v. Schober, 380 So.2d 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). (These cases
did impose the "double burden" rule in change of custody cases; they apparently did not apply
article 157 retroactively).
With respect to giving custody to the parent or the non-parent, a rebuttable presumption was
established in Wood v. Beard, 290 So.2d 675 (La. 1974), that the child's best interests are better
served by awarding custody to the parent, rather than the non-parent, absent proof of the
parent's unfitness or inability to provide care. See also Deville v. LaGrange, 379 So.2d 37, 40-41
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 381 So.2d 1230 (La. 1980). (This case resulted in an
amendment to LA. Civ. CODE art. 256 concerning tutorship of the illegitimate child); Juneau v.
Bordelon, 380 So.2d 208 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
290. State ex rel Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc.2d 1084, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (1973).
291. Id.
292. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L.
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Perhaps the views of psychiatrists and psychologists, though inconclusive,
should be considered by courts. 293 If this conclusion represents a well-accepted
view, the gender of the parties involved in a custody dispute may be a proper
factor to consider. If the amendments to Civil Code Articles 146 and 157 are
construed to eliminate the consideration of gender even as a factor, the best in-
terests of the child standard might prove, ironically, to be not in the best in-
terests of the child.
Perhaps the courts and legislatures avoid the question by awarding custody
to one or the other parent. The best interests of the child are in fact served
when a child is able to have a relationship with both parents. In most custody
disputes both parents love, care for, and want the child. Most parents are not
unfit or otherwise unsuitable to have custody. The judge's charge to find a
solution in the best interests of the child mandates application of a nebulous
and difficult standard when the decision must be made between two worthy
parents. 294 It seems absurd to assume that it is necessary to make a choice at all
and eliminate the important role of either parent for his or her child, simply
because the marital relationship of the parents has broken down. Never-
theless, this absurdity is the rule in Louisiana courts and in most other states.
V. CHILD CUSTODY AND PARENTAL AUTHORITY IN OTHER
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES
A. During the Ongoing Marriage
Generally, state family law in the United States provides that parents in an
ongoing .traditional family have the concurrent rights and obligations to live
with, supervise, care for, rear and educate their children. 295 In conjunction
with these rights and obligations, parents have the authority to consent to their
children's medical care and to administer their children's earnings. 296 Most
REv. 55 (1969), cited in H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW (1978).
293. Id
294. It would be a mistake if this standard were to be the conduit for nearly unfettered judicial
discretion in applying personal lifestyle preferences in child custody disputes.
295. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13, SS 701, 703; CAL. Civ. CODE, SS 196, 196(a) (West
Supp. 1980); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW $ 32 (McKinney); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, S 132. See also
notes 1-46 and accompanying text supra; Mnookin, supra note 46, at 228 n.10.
296. The parental right to, and authority over, children ofthe marriage has not been seriously
questioned in the United States; indeed, it has actually been constitutionalized. See generaly Con-
stitution & Family, supra note 50; Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on the Best Interests of the Child Test May
Be Unconstitutional: Religion As a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHToN L. REV. - (1981).
Justice Blackmun, on June 1, 1981, in his dissenting opinion in the case ofLassiter v. Dept. of
Social Services of Durham County, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981), explained the constitu-
tional preeminence of this right:
This interest occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family
life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility ... [F]ar more precious ...
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than property rights ... parental rights have been deemed to be among those "essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,".., and to be more significant and
priceless than "liberties which demure merely from shifting economic
arrangements."... Accordingly, although the Constitution is verbally silent on the
specific subject of families, freedom of personal choice in matters of family life long has
been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest worthy of protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment.... Within the general ambit of family integrity, the Court has
accorded a high degree of constitutional respect to a natural parent's interest both in
controlling the details of the child's upbringing ... and in retaining the custody and
companionship of the child.
Id. at 2165-66.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the United States Supreme Court held a
Nebraska law that prohibited teaching foreign languages to children below the eighth grade level
of schooling to be unconstitutional as it, ".... interfere[d] with the calling of modem language
teachers, with the opportunities of students to acquire knowledge, and with power of parents to
control the education of their own." Id. at 401. A close reading of the case will indicate to-the
reader that the court also placed considerable weight on the rights of the children and the
teachers; the court appeared more concerned about the homogenization of the society than with
parental rights per se. However, the assumption of the'existence of parental-authority clearly ex-
ists. Consit ution & Family, supra note 50.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court held that the right and authority
of parents to send their children to private military school was part of "the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of (their) children. ... ." d- at 534-35. "It is
not seriously debatable that the parental right to guide one's child intellectually and religiously is
a most substantial part of the liberty and freedom of the parent." Id.. at 518.
The-United States Supreme Court has reinforced this view of the parental right and authority
to rear one's own children on many occasions. In 1944, it held that "the custody, care and nur-
ture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944). The Court stated that this authority was part of the "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter," absent compelling justification. Id. In 1968, the Court declared:
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our socie-
ty." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
For a discussion of the fundamental interests of parents, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). See also note 50 supra. With regard to the unconstitutionality of state regulation of the
family, see Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842
(1977); Moore v. City of-East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972).
In Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), four justices of the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized the importance of the traditional view that parental authority is an essential part of the
American "tradition of individual liberty." Id. Althouigh it is well recognized that parents have
the right and authority to raise their children, the breadth of this authority has not been clearly
established. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 573 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]; Folberg
& Graham, supra note 3, at 523, 537. This authority has been recognized to include the right and
obligation to educate and to control the religious upbringing of one's children. The courts have
also determined that parental authority includes the power to control and discipline one's
children, the duty to provide necessary and appropriate medical care and the obligation to pro-
tect and care for one's children. In Burge v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal.2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d
6, 12 (1953), Chief Justice Traynor defined custody during marriage as, "the sum of parental
rights with respect to the rearing of a child including its care. It includes the right to the child's
services and earnings ... and the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his
care and control, education, health, and religion." Id. The law in the United States has not dif-
ferentiated between the obligation to, and authority over, one's children, at least not as it relatts
to the two parents during marriage. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 538. Nevertheless, both
Great Britain and Australia have recently passed legislation under which either parent may apply
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states have provided that both the mother and the father are liable for the sup-
port of their children. 2 7
However, just as in France or Louisiana, the parents will lose or forfeit
these rights and obligations upon a showing of unfitness or upon proof that the
child will be harmed by remaining under the authority or in the custody of his
or her parents. Generally, if the parents have promoted their child's delin-
quency, or have been found to have participated in outrageous moral miscon-
duct, or to have neglected, abused or abandoned their child, the state will act
in its role as parens patriae to remove the child from parental custody.298
for a court order differentiating and delineating custodial rights and duties during the marriage.
Id. at 538 n.97. See also Gaddis and Bintliff, supra note 50. Since 1970, the majority of states in the
United States have amended their laws to provide that the obligations and rights of parental
authority apply equally to both parents. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 538 n.97. 1.
297. Mnookin, supra note 46, at 228 n.10. Since 1804, the Louisiana Civil Code has provided
for a reciprocal obligation of support. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 203, 205 (1804) (amended 1979).
See also LA. Civ. CODE arts. 227, 229. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-9; IOWA CODE S 252.2
(1970); CAL. CIv. CODE §5 196, 196(a) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 32 (MeKin-
ney).
298. See generally Cogan,Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae, "22 S.C. L.
REv. 147 (1970). Problems relating to parental authority and custody arise in a variety of cir-
cumstances. State intervention asparenspatriae is only one example of such a circumstance. Pro-
fessor Mnookin has described custody law today as "a complicated and chaotic multiplicity of
such factors as the doctrinal thread invoked, the identity of the disputants, their prior relationship
to the child, and the setting from which the dispute arose." Mnookin, supra note 46, at 227.
Issues regarding custody of children arise in at least four situations: (1) after divorce or separa-
tion; (2) in relationship to guardianship problems; (3) pursuant to juvenile court child-negiect
laws; and (4) under laws relating to termination of parental rights in order to free a child for
adoption. Id. This article will not concentrate on the latter three types of cases. One should note,
however, that much of the confusion has arisen because different standards are applied, depend-
ing on the type of situation before the court. As such, some writers have suggested that there be
some significant movement toward a unified standard to be applied in all cases relating to child
custody. Id. at 246-49. See also CLARK, supra note 50, at 572-75.
From a psychiatric point of view, at least some experts in the field feel that "where the
[psychological] tie is to adults who are 'unfit' as parents, unbroken closeness to them and
especially identification with them may cease to be a benefit and become a threat. In extreme
cases this necessitates state interference." GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 180, at
19-20; LA. CODEJUV. PROC. arts. 403-407; LA. CRIM. CODE arts. 74-75. See also Note, A Fit
Parent May Be Deprived of Custody of His Child If The Best Interest and Welfare of The Child Would Be
Served By Allowing Another Person to Raise Him, 4 Hous. L. REv. 131 (1966). See, e.g., State ex rel.
Sharpe v. Banks, 25 Ind. 495, 500 (1865); Lovell v. House of the Good Shepard, 9 Wash. 419, 37
P. 660 (1894). See also In re Goodenough, 19 Wis. 291, 296-97 (1865), wherein the courts refused
to remove children from parental custody absent proof of parental unfitness. But see In re Black, 3
Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955), where parental rights and
authority were terminated because the parents were polygasnists.
Professor Clark explains that the origins of the state's use of the parenspatriae (power of the state
to act to protect children or to act for their welfare) was part of the equity jurisdiction in England,
as early as the seventeenth century. CLARK, supra note 296, at 572. The origin of this jurisdiction,
however, is disputed. Id. See II J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§
1327-1361 (16 ed. 1972) (London 1836); HOCHHEIMER, supra note 47. Story describes this power
of the state which has had a long tradition in the United States:
[A]lthough, in general, parents are entrusted with the custody of the persons, and the
education of their children, yet this is done upon the natural presumption, that the
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Recently, however, a number of states have moved away from the strict re-
quirement that parents be found unfit before custody or parental authority
may be forfeited by or removed from them. In one Louisiana case, 299 other-
wise fit parents who apparently loved their child, but who had not seriously at-
tempted for some seven years to regain custody over that child, forfeited their
right to custody. The court held that the child's best interests would be served
if she were allowed to remain with her aunt and uncle, with whom she had liv-
ed for the aforementioned seven years. The aunt and uncle had, in effect,
become the child's psychological parents.300
children will be properly taken care of, and will be brought up with a due education in
literature, and morals, and religion; and that they will be treated with kindness and af-
fection. But, whenever this presumption is removed; whenever [for example] it is
found, that a father is guilty of gross ill treatment or cruelty towards his infant children;
or that he is in constant habits of drunkenness and blasphemy, or low and gross
debauchery; or that he professes atheistical or irreligious principles; or that his-domestic
associations are such as tend to the corruption and contamination of his children; or
that he otherwise acts in a manner injurious to the morals or interests ofhis children; in
every such case, the Court of Chancery will interfere, and deprive him of the custody of
his children and appoint a suitable person to act as guardian, and to take care of them,
and to superintend their education.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 702 (7th ed. 1857), quoted in Mnookin,
supra note 46, at 240 n.67. Professor Mnookin notes that by the seventeenth century, Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, and Virginia specifically authorized magistrates to "bind out" or indenture
children of the poor, over parental objection. Id. See 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 64-70
(R. Bremner ed. 1970). The history of child-neglect laws is presented in Thomas, ChildAbue and
Neglect Part 1: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1972);
Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205, 223 (1971).
Of course, the power of the state as the parens patriae in France and Louisiana is not a part of
"equity" jurisdiction, as there is no such thing. In these states, the power simply exists and is en-
forceable in the appropriate courts pursuant to the state's police power.
299. Paul v. Peniston, 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228 (1928).
300. She called them "mama" and "pappy." Id. The court reached this result in spite of the
fact that the Louisiana Civil Code does not provide for the court to award custody, in the best in-
terests of the child, to anyone but the parents of the child. See LA. Clv. CODE arts. 146, 157. The
Louisiana Civil Code does provide that parental authority ends, and- the regime of tutorship
arises upon dissolution of the marriage of the parents, by death or divorce, or upon legal separa-
tion. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 150, 246. If read literally, if the code requires the judge to establish
custody in either one or the other ex-spouse, and if tutorship belongs of right (as a matter of law)
to the custodial parent, it may not be possible for a judge to allow shared or joint custody after
legal separation or divorce. However, it may be possible for the judge to establish some sort of
joint or shared tutorship, which includes the authority to control the person of the minor; this
authority, of course, is the most important aspect of custody, as it provides the parent with the
authority to rear the child. However, in order to provide for some sort ofjoint-tutorship, ajudge
will have to overcome the language of Louisiana Civil Code Article 246 which provides: "The
minor not emancipated is placed under the authority of a tutor after the dissolution of the mar-
riage of his father and mother or the separation from bed and board of either one." LA. CIV.
CODE art. 246. He would also have to overcome Louisiana Civil Code Article 250 which pro-
vides: "Upon divorce or judicial separation ... of the parents, the tutorship of each minor child
belongs of right to the parent under whose care he or she has been placed or to whose care he or
she has been entrusted." LA. CIV. CODE art. 250. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 148; LA. CODE
Civ. PRO. arts. 4061-4070.
Any legislation providing for joint or shared tutorship would also have to resolve the problem
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Similarly, the law in California relating to child custody provides that a
parent may forfeit the right to custody of his or her child and that the state may
place such a child in the custody of a third party when the court finds that an
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child, and the award
to the non-parent is required to serve the best interests of the child.3 01 The
California Supreme Court has held that the applicable section of the Civil
Code allows a court to deprive a parent of custody, even though the parent is
not unfit, "upon a clear showing that such award is essential to avert harm to
the child." 30 2
Similarly, under Texas law, a court may deprive a parent of custody of his
or her child. Texas legislation allows the judge substantial discretion to award
custody to third persons if "the appointment of the parent would not be in the
best interests of the child.' '
s3
These changes notwithstanding, most courts in the United States correctly
continue to reject the notion that the judiciary should award or remove
custody of children through a balancing of the comparative strengths and
weaknesses of parents and non-parents. 30 4
of liability for damage occasioned by the child. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2318-2319. Pursuant to
Article 4069 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the court may appoint an institution or
person as tutor over the patrimony while another person may be appointed as tutor over the per-
son of the minor child. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. art. 4069. However, there havd been no cases, nor is
there any direct statutory authority, for the sharing of tutorship over the person of the child. But
see State ex rel. Bannister v. Bannister, 198 So.2d 196 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1967).
Nevertheless, if the standard for determination of custody (and possibly of tutorship as well) is
the best interest of the child, (see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 146, 157, 256) ifa court determines that it
would be in the best interest of the child to be under a form of shared custody or tutorship,
perhaps it could then establish such a regime. For a discussion of Louisiana law on this subject,
see note 288 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 51-181 and accompanying text supra, for a
discussion of French law on this subject. According to three noted social scientists the notion of
the "psychological parent" is very important. See GOLDST7N, FREUD & SOLNrr, supra note 180.
These three authors develop the concept and define the term "psychological parent" as follows:
Whether a parent becomes the psychological parent of a child is based ... on day-to-
day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. The role can be fulflrled either
by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any other caring adult, but never
by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child
may be.
Id. at 19.
301. CAL. Civ. CODE S 4600 (West Supp. 1980).
302. In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 699, 523 P.2d 244, 258 (1974), cited in Mnookin, supra note 46,
at 228 n.9.
303. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. S 14.01(b) (Vernon).
304. Wood v. Beard, 290 So.2d 675 (La. 1974); Paul v. Peniston, 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228
(1958); Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613, 617-18 (1922); Baumann v. Baumann,
169 Neb. 805, 807-09, 101 N.W.2d 192, 193-94 (1960); Oster, Custod Proceedings: A Study of Vagu
andIndinite Sndards, 5J. FAM. L. 21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Oster]. See also Gilmore v. Kit-
son, 65 Ind. 402, 407, 74 N.E. 1083, 1084 (1905); Norval v. Zinsmaster, 57 Neb. 158, 161-62, 77
N.W. 373, 374 (1898); In re Meade, 113 Wash. 504, 508-10, 194 P. 807, 809 (1920).
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B. After Divorce or Separation
The most common instance of disputed child custody arises after judicial
separation °50 or divorce.3 0 6 Courts have two problems to "resolve. First, the
courts must reconcile the competing demands of the parents. Second, they
must protect the child.
3 0 7
An evolution from the "paternal preference" rule,3 0 8 to the "maternal
preference" rule,30 9 to the "best interests of the child" test has taken place in
child custody determinations. Except in very early Roman and Anglo-Saxon
law, courts tempered both the paternal and the maternal preferences with no-
tions of the best interests of the child and parental fault. Thus, depending on
the rule in force, courts would award custody to the father or to the mother
after separation or divorce unless that person. had been at fault, had forfeited
the right or had otherwise appeared to the court to be unfit to provide for the
welfare of the child.3Y0
Analysis of the laws relating to child custody and parental 'authority in.
France and Louisiana indicates that the courts have perceived (or developed) a
tension between the rights of parents to have authority over and custody of
their children and the children's right as individuals to be protected. In a
similar manner, most courts in- the United States generally have based their
decisions relating to child custody and parental authority either on a form of
the theory of parental rights or alternatively on their notion of child protec-
tion, or the best interests of the child.311 The "best interest of the child"
305. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE art. 146; MICH. COMP. LAWS S 552.15 (1967); S.C. COMP.
LAWSANN. 5 25-4-45 (1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. 9 767.23(1) (West); UTAH CODEANN. S 30-3-10
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 5 11-7 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
306. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. S 30-3-10. See also OHIO REV. ConE ANN. S 3109.04 (Page);
Wis. STAT. ANN. S 767.24, cited in Mnookin, supra note 46, at 232 n.22.
307. Mnookin, supra note 46, at 232.
308. See notes 32-44 and accompanying text, supra.
309. See notes 241-253 and accompanying text supra. See also Roth supra note 46, at 423, which
indicates that 37 states maintain a "maternal preference" rule, in spite of so-called equalization
statutes passed by their legislatures.
310. J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIEs ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 520 (1852); J.
LLOYD, LAW OF DIVORCE 3, 40-145 (1887).
As of 1980, most states in the United States had eliminated any explicit "maternal" or "pater-
nal preference" rule. See, e.g., UTAH CODEANN. 5 30-3-10 (amended 1977); LA. Civ. CODE arts.
146, 157 (amended 1979 & 1977 respectively). Professor Roth indicates, however, that at least 37
of the states which have adopted these so-called "equalization" statutes, still raise a presumption
in favor of a "preferred" parent. See authorities cited in Roth, supra note 46, at nn.38-52.
311. For a significant time, the distinction between the two theories-has perhaps been more
one of semantics than of substance. Courts have usually presumed that, barring exceptional cir-
cumitances, the child's best interests are served by placing him with his parents. Warburg, supra
note 47, at 481-82. See, e.g., Whalen v. Olmstead, 61 Conn. 263, 267, 23 A. 964 (1891); Chapsky
v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 654-58, 40 Am. Rep. 321 (1881); Corrie v. Corrie, 42 Mich. 509, 4 N.W.
213 (1880); English v. English, 32 N.J. Eq. 738, 742-43 (1880).
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theory has emphasized protection of the rights or interests of the child as an in-
dividual having a legal personality, 312 as well as of the embryo of a future
citizen, who needs to be protected by the state for the child's and the state's
awn g'ood.313
Today, appellate courts in the United States, in a manner consistent with
courtsin France, usually hold that decisions relating to parental authority, in
general, and to custody of children, specifically, should be decided on a case-
by-case basis, with the trial court having significant discretion to decide the
case in the best interests of the child. Of course, the "best interests of the
child" standard is vague enough to allow decisions covering the entire spec-
trum of possibilities. The trial judge may find, in his discretion, that the
child's best interests will be served through the validation and enforcement of
his or her parents' rights. Alternatively, the judge may find that the child's in-
terests will be best served if custody is awarded to a third party, even though
the child's parents are not found to be unfit or to have forfeited their rights.3 14
The best interests standard and its derivatives are indeterminate and
speculative for a variety of reasons. One authority has suggested two of the
most important reasons: (1) psychological theories are general doctrines which
can only imprecisely be applied to specific cases; thus, they cannot guarantee
that any decision will in fact be in the best interests of a child; and (2) no con-
sensus exists among scholars or in society generally as to the correct
psychological theory.3 15 Psychologists and psychiatrists and, afortiori, judges
are virtually incapable of predicting what will be in the be.-t interests of the
child, at least in the context of a dispute in which both parents compete for
custody and in which both parents are fit in all respects.3t 6
312. This is opposed to ancient law wherein the child was perceived as property. See notes 1-62
and accompanying text supra.
313. See, e.g., cases cited in note 311 supra. See generally Oster, supra note 304; Mnookin, supra
note 46.
314. E.g., Nye v. Nye, 343 I1. App. 477, 483, 99 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1951). Social and
psychoanalysts Goldstein, Solnit and Freud believe that the standard ought to be that of the
"least detrimental available alternative." GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 180, at 99.
This notion was rejected in Lacherv. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613,618(1922); Baumann
v. Baumann, 169 Neb. 805, 101 N.W.2d 192, 195 (1960).
315. Mnookin, supra note 46, at 229, 257-72. Even the attempt by some states to break down
ihe elements into an itemized list of the "best interests" test does not help the court in most in-
stances. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. 5 25.312(1).
316. SeeA. Freud, Child Observation and Prediction of Development - A Memorial Lecture
in Honor of Ernst Kris, reprinted in 13 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 92, 97-98
(1958). See also GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 180, at 6, 51-52, 63, 83-84, 114, 168-70
(1973); Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053 (1968); S. ESCALONA, THE
RoOTs OF INDIVIDUALITY: NORMAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN INFANCY 13 (1968), cited in
Mnookin, supra note 46, at 259 n.163.
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VI. SUGGESTED REFOR
A. Shared Custody
A dilemma exists. On the one hand, it is virtually impossible to choose bet-
ween two worthy spouses. On the other hand, it is at least undesirable, and
perhaps unconstitutional to employ a shortcut, stereotypical presumption.
Dual or shared custody arrangements should be considered. Under such a
doctrine, the court, bef6re awarding custody, would still be required to assess
the adequacy of care the child would receive and the fitness or suitability of the
parents, as well as other factors such as the impact on the child of continued or
frequent change and the possibility that the arrangement would promote con-
tinued strife. However, absent a factual finding that such an arrangement
would be harmful to the child, the court could recognize the retention of
parental authority in both of the parents and establish, or encourage the
parents to establish, some arrangement based on a principle of concurrent
authority with a sharing of duties, responsibilities and benefits. Such an ar-
rangement might help to allay the trauma caused to parents and children by
divorce and would eliminate the tendency to use the child as a weapon in the
battle for divorce.317
The difficulty in advocating a system of shared custody or authority stems
from the fact that when a marriage breaks up, our system of laws has
heretofore fostered competition, a power struggle for alimony, child support
and custody. Unfortunately, this devastating battleground, with the gradual
elimination of fault-based divorces and with the elimination of fault-based
denial of alimony, has.been shifting to the issue of child custody.3 18
Furthermore, the rights and interests of the child, the parents, the family
and the state compete in all child custody disputes. This fact has not been ac-
cepted by the leading opponents of shared custody. 319 Moreover, these rights
317. The language of Article 146 of the Louisiana Civil Code before its amendment in 1979,
provided room for development of such a shared or joint custody scheme. Article 146 formerly
read that the child should be awarded to the wife, "unless there should be strong reasons to
deprive her of it, either in whole or in part." Articles 146 and 157, since their respective amend-
ments in 1979 and 1977, both require the determination ofwhether custody should be awarded to
the husband or the wife in accordance with the best interests of the child. Although the articles
use the conjunction "or," the tenor and primary aim of the articles seem to be to better promote
the best interest and welfare of the children. This being true, it might not be unreasonable and
would be consistent with the aim of the articles to award custody to both parents on a controlled
basis of sharing rights and obligations vis-a-vis the children.
318. This tendency has been promoted by noted psychoanalysts who believe that it is impor-
tant for the well-being of the child to have a determination of custody between two disputing
spouses made definitively, awarding custody to one of them only. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT,
supra note 180, at 113-33. See Weitzman and Dixon, supra note 42.
319. See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 180.
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and interests have constitutional as well as psychological implications, and,
thus, transcend the dissolution of the relationship of the husband and wife.
B. Balancing the Rights and Interests of Parents, Children and the State
In general, issues in the area of child custody turn on whether or not the in-
terests and rights of the child, the parents, the family and the state are in com-
petition and, if they are, in what way. The French Civil Code assumes that
children benefit by a continuing relationship with both parents120 This
assumption precludes situations in which the children of divorced couples are
shunted back and forth between parents or in which the courts divide physical
or even legal custody of the children between the two parents. The courts
award custody to one of the parents; this award is definitive, barring proof
that the custodial parent has failed in his or her obligation to rear the children
properly. However, notwithstanding this permanent custody award, the non-
custodial parent retains the right and obligation to assist materially and
spiritually in the rearing of the children. The custodial parent may not inhibit
the continuing relationship of the other parent with the child. This system con-
siders such interference by either parent with the other parent's rights and
obligations as detrimental to the child per se. Such interference can cause the
forfeiture of the right. Cooperation forms part of the notion of promoting the
child's best interests. Recognition of these rights and obligations and enforce-
ment of them by the courts apparently do not cause more harm to the child,
but instead create an atmosphere of cooperation.
In the United States, courts serve a dual function in custody disputes. On
the one hand, a court must resolve a dispute between antagonistic parents,
both of whom want exclusive custody. On the other hand, a court must protect
the child.3 21 The solutions to these two problems are not mutually exclusive.
In protecting the particular rights of parents and families in the matter of
rearing their children, a community can also further several broader societal
interests, including: (1) the sense of fulfillment and joy that parents experience
in rearing their children; (2) the positive impact on their children resulting
from the intimate and affectionate family environment which only those
closest to the children can offer; and (3) societal strength through pluralism
and diversity that develops from the freedom of a parent to rear his
children.322
320. See rIII supra.
321. See GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 180.
322. Constitution & Family, supra note 50, at 1353. The importance of intimate familiarity be-
tween the child and those who rear him relates more to the "psychological parent" than to the
biological parent per se.
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1. Constitutional Rights
Given that parents and families have constitutionally protected rights and
interests, the following question arises: does a child have the constitutionally
protected right not to have the state interfere with his ongoing relationship
with both parents. Although experts generally do not dispute the premise that
children are better off when both parents assume responsibility together
without serious dissention, the argument does not suggest that the child has a
constitutional right to the continuation of his family as a unit. Parents, in fact,
have the power to dissolve their marital or other relationships. Nevertheless,
an argument that the child has constitutionally protected rights to a continuing
relationship with both parents and to the input of both parents for his proper
rearing, which right may not be interferred with by state action absent clear
indications that the continued relationship may harm the child, is tenable. The
state has no authority to inhibit a child's relationship with either parent, even
at the behest of one of them, unless the relationship would cause some ar-
ticulable harm to the child.323 Furthermore, children, although not enjoying
rights co-extensive with those of adults, 324 dearly have protected rights under
the Constitution, such as the rights to obtain contraceptives and to have an
abortion without parental consent, 325 the right to due process,3 26 and the right
to the protection of the First -Amendment.327
The authority of parents to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society. 328 The primary function of a parent in our society is to
care for and nurture his children. This is a parental right which the state can
"neither supply nor hinder. ' ' 32 9 Every parent also has a constitutionally pro-
tected interst in "the companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her children," because of the importance of protecting the warm, enduring,
and important familial bonds which the child and society require.
330
The growing recognition of the rights belonging to both parent and child
transcends the notion of the traditional family. The United States Supreme
323. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1949); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968).
324. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the
New Egalitarianisin Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "'Rights", 1976 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 605; Solnit, Child-Rearing and Child Advocacy, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 723.
325. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
326. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
327. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
328. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
329. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
330. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972).
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Court has indicated that a state is prohibited from standardizing its children
- and its adults - by forcing them to live in certain narrowly defined family
patterms. 331 Protected interests include the extended family3 32 and unwed
giological parents who have undertaken the responsibility for rearing their
children. 33
3
2. Societal Interests
The parental right or interest to rear one's children is not a right or interest
which exists abstractly in all parents or which exists for a parent as an in-
dividual simply because of his or her biological or psychological relationship to
a child. It is an interest based on the related needs and rights of individuals liv-
ing together in society. The interest arises from the spiritual, material, and
psychological needs of both parents and children who have become or will
become part of a parent-child relationship. Thus, although the parent's right
to rear his or her child has been the right most often articulated, it is in-
separable from a set of concomitant obligations and the right of the child.
Moreover, the fulfillment of both the parent's and child's interests serves the
state interest.
All mental health professionals agree that depriving a child of his relation-
ship with those he loves, unless there are extreme circumstances, such as child
abuse, or continued serious strife in the family, will harm the child.3 3 4
Therefore, the state must retain its parenspatriae function of protecting children
when "their physical or mental health is jeopardized." 3 5 However, there are
constitutional limitations on the state's application of this power. 336
VII. CONCLUSION
The concept of parental authority is in the process of evolution. Until
recently, modem usage of the concept resembled, in many respects, the at-
tenuated patria potestas of later Roman law. Even under the Empire of Con-
stantine, the state perceived the role of the father less as a function of pater
familias and more in terms of the family 4ua family. The Germanic concept of
mundium contributed to the recognition that parental rights also entail parental
obligations. France adopted the combined notions of rights, obligations and
331. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268. U.S. 510, 535 (1925).'&e also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
332. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
333. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979).
334. Constitution & Famib, supra note 50, at 1317-20.
335. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
336. Constitution &Family, supra note 50, at 1317.
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responsibility inherent in mundium under the droit coutumier of the north. The
progressively modern approach of the current French Civil Code goes back to
the droit coutumier, under which la puissance paternelle belonged to the mother as
well as the father. The Civil Code, while codifying in a uniform, coherent
manner the rights and obligations comprising parental authority, also gives
the system flexibility to adapt to the needs and interests of the family.
Underlying the Civil Code is the policy that parental authority exists as a
shared task to promote the felicity of the family, and consequently the best in-
terests of the child.
The Civil Code's coherent conceptualization of familial rights and duties
provides the French courts with a solution to most cases in which both parents
desire to rear their children after divorce. The French view is that a child
benefits from a continuing, healthy relationship with both divorced parents.
Such a set of relationships requires that all parties work together to achieve a
common goal. The legislators have undertaken to facilitate such cooperation
without abrogating the fundamental rights of either parent or child.
Although there has never been a coherent policy regarding parental authori-
ty in the United States, with the possible exception of Louisiana, the Supreme
Court and various federal appellate courts have attempted to establish a
measure of uniformity to define the rights and obligations arising out of the
parent-child relationship. 337 The Supreme Court has held that the-family, as-
an entity, has an interest in its own -autonomy and in the privacy of its
members.3 38
Most child custody statutes today reflect an overreaction to divorce by tak-
ing from the non-custodial parent and the child many of the rights arising
from their relationship, rather than promoting a continuation of these rights
and the relationship which may be most beneficial to the child. Statutes
relating to child custody, for whatever purpose, should be redrafted so as to
focus on the continuing substantive rights of both the parent and the child.
They should be drafted to promote the basic policy that parent and child are
both best served by maintenance of their relationship, unless clear and ar-
ticulable harm will result to the child therefrom. The statutes should be drawn
narrowly to provide for the least possible interference with the fundamental
337. See note 296 and accompanying text supra. The early 19th century decisions, which re-
fused to withdraw children from parental custody barring a clear showing of unfitness, acknowl-
edged, nonetheless, that the child's welfare, not the parental right,-was the paramount interest
involved.
338. E.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
842 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1977) (integrity of the family unit protected by the 9th and 14th
amendments); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (there exists a private realm of
family life that the state cannot enter); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see
Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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rights and psychological needs of parent and child. The laws should be drafted
in a manner that will indicate the substantive rights and obligations of parents
and children in all circumstances.3 3 9 This approach would replace "the best
interests of the child" standard with a "prevention of harm to the child" or
"least detrimental alternative" approach, built upon the primary notion that
children, parents and society will be served best by maintenance of the parent-
child relationship.
Many courts have disapproved ofjoint or shared custody arrangements on
the ground that such an arrangement would frustrate the child's need for
stability and consistency.3 40 Many judges follow psychoanalysts Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit and question the ability of all but the most exceptional
divorced parents to cooperate with each other even within the limited realm of
serving the well-being of their children.3 41 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit argue
that for optimal psycho-social development, children require a sharply defined
locus of authority. These psychoanalysts draw from this fact their major objec-
tion to joint or shared custody arrangements: that the fluidity of such an ar-
rangement might induce a highly detrimental psychological instability.34 2
Children need stability and a sharply defined locus of authority. However,
the argument that the authority will be any less focused or defined after
divorce within a joint or shared custody arrangement than it is in an ongoing
marriage does not necessarily follow from this premise. Indeed, during the
339. See Constitution & Family, supra note 50, at 1323, 1325. See also GOLDSTEIN, FREUD &
SoLNrr, supra note 180, at 31, 113-33. The Goldstein position is criticized in Strauss & Strauss,
Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. Rv. 996, 1002 (1974); Dembitz, BeyondAny Discplint s Competence,
83 YALE L:J. 1304, 1310 (1974); Seegenerally Benedek & Benedek, Post Divorce Visitation: A Child's
Right, 16 J. AmER. AcAD. OF CHILD PSYCH. 256-71 (1977); M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE
DISPOSABLE PARENr 119-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ROMAN & HADDAD]; Abarbanel, Shared
Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study ofJoint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 320, 325-26
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Arbarbanel]; H. BILLER, FATHER, CHILD AND SEX ROLE 86 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BILLER]; J. DESPERT, CHILDREN OFDIVORCE83 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
DESPERT]; Grote & Weinstein, Joint Custody: A Viable and IdealAlternative, 13. DIvORCE 43, 48-50
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Grote & Weinstein]; Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 529; Weitz-
man & Dixon, supra note 42. See also Crouch, An Essay on the Critical andJudicial Reception of Beyond
the Best Interest of the Child, 13 FAM. L. Q. 49 (1979); M. Wald, ThinkingAbout Public Policy Toward
Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Review of BEFORE THE BEsT INTEREsTS OF THE CHILD, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 645 (1980).
340. See, e.g., Utley v. Utley, 364 A.2d 1167, 1170 (D.C. 1976); In re Marriage of Pergament,
28 Or. App. 459, 462, 559 P.2d 942, 943 (1977); Cradic v. Cradic, 544 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Mo.
App. 1977); Ponder v. Rice, 479 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Rickard v. Rickard, 7
Wash. App. 907, 911-12, 503 P.2d 763, 766 (1973); Lumbra v. Lumbra, 136 Vt. 529, 531-33,
394 A.2d 1139, 1141-42 (1978).
341. E.g., Schexnayder v. Schexnayder, 343 So.2d 393, 396 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977);
Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589-90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (1978); Dodd v. Dodd, 93
Misc.2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1978); Dunavant v. Dunavant, 31 Tenn. App. 634, 219
S.W.2d 910, 915-16 (1949), cited in Constitution & Family, supra note'50, at 1325 n.95.
342. GO.DsTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 180, at 31-34, 37-39; Constitution &Family, supra
note 50, at 1325. But see Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 556-61.
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marriage, both parents have concurrent authority over their children. If the
relationship is working as it optimally should, the parents will discuss any
disagreement and work out a method of best serving their children. If the mar-
riage is not working at its optimum pitch, disputes will arise. Sometimes
divorce ensues. Although divorced parents live apart and sometimes have
disagreeable feelings towards each other, the argument that divorced parents
cannot discuss problems about rearing their children and work out solutions to
any disagreement is not necessarily valid. Where defaco shared custody ar-
rangements have been attempted, this cooperative process has been known to
work. 343 There is no reason, notwithstanding the beliefs of opponents of
shared custody, that legislatively or judicially encouraged cooperation should
not also work.
The problems raised by these opponents are significant. These opponents,
in fact, penetrate the core of the child custody problem. While there is no
doubt that children within and without the ongoing traditional marriage are
damaged by continual bickering and instability, the assumption that
legislatively or judicially encouraged cooperation in shared custody after
divorce is detrimental per se is erroneous-. If the parents do not wish to
cooperate or are incapable of cooperating, and, evidence indicates significant
hostility between them, no shared custody arrangement should be approved.
This is not much different from saying that patents should resolve their pro-
blems within the marriage or get a divorce.
An additional argument made against shared custody is that the child may
be hurt if he is required to make continual 6hanges in residence over signifi-
cant distance and time. Although this argument may be true, to apply it to
shared custody or shared parental authority assumes that shared custody re-
quires exchange of the child's residence between the parents. Many courts'
social science analysts have confused shared custody with divided custody.
Shared custody ought to be viewed as a sharing of authority, i.e., rights and
obligations in the rearing of the child, rather than simply the right to have a
fixed amount of the child's physical presence. This would allow fulfillment of
the parental authority function and maintain the rights and interests of those
involved. 344
Statutes relating to child custody after divorce should establish a rebuttable
presumption that the child will be most benefited or, preferably, least harmed
by an arrangement whereby he or she will have the continuing contribution
and love of both parents. The presumption can be rebutted by a showing that
343. J. Go DSTEIN, A. FRtuD & A. SoLNTE, BEFoRE TmE BEST INTEREsTs OF THE CHILD 31
(1979).
344. For a discussion of the differences in types of custody arrangements and some useful ideas
regarding solutions to child custody problems, see Folberg and Graham, supra note 3, at 526-30.
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such an arrangement will harm the child. However, the harm should be ar-
ticulable and clearly shown. Such a statute should not provide the courts with
a short-cut assumption that promotion of shared authority arrangements is
harmful. Such an assumption does not comport with reality and it violates
fundamental interests of the child, the parents and society. Furthermore, such
an assumption engenders rather than eliminates hostile litigation over the
custody of the children.
The suggested statutory mechanism provides a judge with at least one addi-
tional step in his determination of what would best benefit the child. The first
step to be taken under this scheme would be for the judge, who has been
presented with a child custody dispute, to suggest to the parties and their at-
torneys that they develop a plan whereby both parents would contribute to the
rearing of the child. Animosity on the part of one spouse to another, or any
purpose inimical to the welfare of the child motivated by a desire to obtain sole
custody or authority would indicate to the court that the parent willing to
cooperate should have sole custody. Of course, under this scheme, either
parent could prove that the other was unfit to have custody over the child or
even to participate in the rearing of the child. An attempt to raise this conten-
tion without evidence or out of spite or animosity would be an abuse of the
process. This abuse would indicate that the parent has failed in his or her
obligation to protect the child's best interests and should thereby forfeit his or
her rights. This would help to take the "weapon" of child custody out of the
parents' hands, and would promote the interests of all involved. Of course, if
both parents were incapable of cooperating and the court finds that shared
custody would be harmful to the child, the court could decide, as under pre-
sent practice, which parent would be least harmful to the child.
Such an approach would encourage parental cooperation. If the parents
participate in a shared custody arrangement, the destructive psychological im-
pact of the divorce would be reduced, as continued input by both parents
would eliminate some of the child's sense of loss, guilt, and inadequacy which
typically accompany divorce.3 45 In addition, the arrangement would allow
parents to share equitably the burden of parenting, thereby avoiding what has
been called the "single-parent overload," experienced by sole custodial
parents.346
345. ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 339; Arbarbanel, supra note 339.
346. Constitution & Family, supra note 50, at 1325; E. LEMASTERS, PARENTS IN MODERN
AMERIcA 160-66 (1977); Folberg and Graham, supra note 3, at 553-56. The amount of
"overload" in the United States is significant.
Dr. U. Bronfenbrenner of Cornell University provides the following statistics: As of 1974, one
of every six children in the United States was living in a family with only one parent. About 95
percent of these families were headed by the mother and a significant number of these mothers
were working; 67 percent of them with school-aged children; 54 percent of them with children
under the age of six; 45 percent of them with children under the age of three. Ninety percent of
these households do not have the advantage of the extended family existence. Bronfenbrenner,
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Psychological evidence shows that a child adjusts better to a divorce if his
parents cooperate in his rearing and continue to involve themselves in his
development.3 47 Therefore, the argument which suggests the approach that
disputed custody ought to be awarded to only one of the parents in all cases, at
least in the sense that it has been understood by the courts, is simplistic.
Although designed to prevent litigation, this approach actually engenders
more frequent and bitter litigation with the child as a pawn or as a weapon.
Furthermore, under this approach the parents get a powerful vehicle for vin-
dictiveness which is clearly damaging to the child.
The author proposes that the courts should presume that the child will be
better off if the parents cooperate even after divorce. Moreover, the law should
encourage parents to cooperate by requiring them to submit a plan of shared
custody or authority based on their cooperation. The author believes that such
an approach would eventually reduce both conflict and use of custody litiga-
tion to hurt an ex-spouse. Underlying this approach is voluntary cooperation
in shared authority over the child, with the proviso that the court will withdraw
a parent's authority (not award it in the first place) if the parent uses that
authority for any purpose other than for the benefit of the child.
During a shared custody arrangement disagreements and disputes between
the parents probably would occur. Indeed, disagreement between parents
regarding the proper way to rear their children is not unlikely. Occasionally,
parents may not be able to resolve their disagreement. However, the reality of
an inevitable disagreement should not cause the courts to avoid their respon-
sibility to enforce the fundamental rights of parents and children.
If the parents simply disagree on a specific course of action, the court first
should encourage the parents to resolve the problem themselves. If parents
cannot resolve the problem, the court could make an appropriate decision bas-
ed on what is best for the child. In making its decision, the court may consider,
among other factors, which parent has spent more time and effort on the
education of the child and which parent is more available to assist and help the
child.
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Of course, if the shared custody arrangement should break down, just as
when a marriage breaks down, the court would have to either promote a solu-
tion of the specific problem or end the arrangement. If the arrangement has
failed to the point of harming the child, the court should decide which parent is
primarily responsible for the breakdown, and which parent will better serve
the child's needs by having full custodial authority over him. This decision is
no different from the decision that must be made in the instance where the
court is following the traditional approach of deciding which parent should
have full and exclusive custody. The author submits that such cases of
unresolvable dispute will not be so frequent as to overburden the judicial
system. A system similar to the one suggested in this article now functions in
France. Moreover, the author believes that the frequency of these disputes
would decline as society accepted the belief that parents who have ended their
marital relationship need not necessarily end their parent-child relationship.
Parents can continue to cooperate in the proper rearing of their children.
Courts should not discourage this development; indeed, they have a duty to
encourage it.
Some courts are, in fact, beginning to encourage shared custody ar-
rangements,3 48 and some states are beginning to develop shared custody
statutes. 349 The author suggests that the Constitution may prohibit the states
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348. E.g., Childers v. O'Neal, 251 Ark. 1097, 476 S.W.2d 799 (1972); Roth v. Roth, 52 I1.
App.3d 220, 367N.E.2d 442 (1977); Mayer v. Mayer, 150 N.J. Super. 556, 561, 376 A.2d 214,
217 (1977); Odette R. v. Douglas R., 91 Misc.2d 792, 399 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95-96 (1977);
Schilleman v. Schilleman, 61 Mich. App. 446, 232 N.W.2d 737 (1975); Perotti v. Perotti, 78
Misc.2d 131, 355 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1974).
349. Some states have adopted joint custody statutes. For example, in 1977, the Oregon
legislature explicitly authorized joint custody. (OR. REV. STAT. S 107.105(1)). It states simply
that the court has the power to decree that the future care and custody of the minor children of the
marriage shall be by one party or jointly whichever may be deemed just and proper. Id. Formerly
courts in Oregon had applied the statute on custody to allow joint custody when the facts merited
it. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 542. The former Oregon law read, "[w]henever the court
grants a decree of annulment or.dissolution of marriage or of separation, it has power further to
decree as follows: (A) for the future care and custody of the minor children of the marriage as it
may deem just and proper." Oregon's legislature did not adopt the house bill on joint custody.
This bill would have encouraged joint custody in keeping with a list of certain circumstances
which indicated when joint custody might be appropriate. See House Bill 2532, Oregon
Legislative Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1977), cited in Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 543.
Wisconsin adopted a joint custody provision on February 1, 1978, which provides joint
custody as an option "if the parties so agree and if the court finds that a joint custody arrange-
ment would be in the best interest of the child or children." WIS. STAT. ANN. S 767.24(1)(b)
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from establishing statutes which discourage cooperation or provide parents
with the potential weapon of child custody that could be used for vindictive
purposes. Furthermore, the Constitution may require the states, to avoid
establishing obstacles to shared custody arrangements. The Constitution may
even oblige the states to promote arrangements such as requiring parents to
negotiate a program or arrangement of shared authority. However, any such
laws should emphasize that shared custody signifies shared authority and
responsibility for the child, and not necessarily divided physical custody. The
law should encourage divorced parents to benefit their children by permitting
them to take part in the parenting process, even though the relationship bet-
ween them as spouses has ended. The various states of the United States
should develop the Civil Code's view of parental authority more fully in their
laws. At the same time, the states should consider the experiences of the civil
code countries. The states could adopt the benefits of conceptual coherency
and other positive elements ofthe French system while utilizing the procedural
advantages and flexibility that exist in common law systems.
(West Cum. Supp. 1980). Under this law, joint custody means that, "both parties have equal
rights and responsibilities to the minor children and neither parties' rights are superior." 1d.
The Utah Legislature has had a bill introduced which provides thatjoint custody is in the best
interests of the child when the parents have agreed to it. In addition, the bill would create a
"custody arbitration and recommendation pool," to be composed of a psychologist, social
worker or marriage counselor, and two local residents with experience in family problems. This
"pool" would make recommendations to the court.
Since 1977, Iowa's statute has provided that, "[w]hen a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the
court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of
the parties as shall be justified. The order may include provision forjoint custody or the children
by the parties .... " IOWA CODE ANN. 5 598.21 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). North
Carolina's statute provides that, "[ain order for custody of a minor child may grant exclusive
custody of such child to one person, agency, organization or institution, or, if clearly in the best
interest of the child, provide for custody in two or more of the same .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. S
50-13.2(b).
Maine's statute provides that, "[the judge] may decree which parent shall have the exclusive
care and custody of the person of such minor or he may apportion the care and custody of the said
minor between the parents, as the good of the child may require." ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 18,
5 217, dted in Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 543.
California has promulgated, effective January 1, 1980, an act which provides that custody be
awarded first to both parents jointly. Under this statute joint custody enjoys a presumption of be-
ing in the best interst of the child when parents have agreed previously to it or agree to it in court.
CAL. CIV. CODE S 4600 (West). Article 4600 provides further that if joint custody is not ap-
propriate, custody shall be awarded to one or the other of the parents. Moreover, "[i]n making
an order for custody to either parent, the Court shall consider, among other factors, which parent
is more likely to allow the child or children frequent and continuing contact ... " with the other
parent. Id. at SS 4600, 4600.5.
Finally, Kansas has recently promulgated a joint custody act which provides that the courts
"may give the care and custody of [the minor children] ..... o the parties jointly if the parties so
agree and if the court finds that ajoint custody arrangement would be in the best interests of the
child or children." KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 60-160(b)(1). "Joint custody under this subsection means
that both parties have equal rights and responsibilities to the minor child, subject to orders of the
court, and neither parties' rights are superior." Id. See generally Foster & Freed, supra note 32 at
343 for a chart and discussion of various laws on joint custody. See also Foster & Freed, Joint
Custody: Legislative Reonrm, 16 TRIAL 22 (June 1980).

